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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

.. . I aee all holy Chria-bendoa ao burdenad by wara and
habreda, robberlea and diaaenaiona^ bhat. it. ia hard bo
name one llbble region, be ib duchy or counby, bhab en
voys good peace

Theae worda wribben by Honore Boneb, probably in 1367,
ring aa brue boday aa when he wrobe bhea.

Our cenbury haa

given birbh bo bhe global war and bhe nuclear war.

Ib haa

seen ao-called convenbional war achieve new heighba o£ dev-

aababion, and ib haa wibneaaed bhe developactnb o£ guerrilla
war£are inbo con£licba o£ parbicularly unbridled aavagery.

Can bhere be any rulea in war?

Or, bo phraae bhe aaae

queabion in obher worda, ia aoae aorb o£ aoraliby poaaible
on bhe babble£ield?

The horrora o£ nuclear and guerrilla

war prompb many bo anawer bhia queabion wibh a £ire, even
vehenenb, **Not**

Cerbainly bhe £acb bhab ailliona o£ non-

conbabanba are bhe bargeba £or hundreda o£ nuclear-areed
aiaalea lenda credence bo bheir denial.

Moreover, bhe vivid

picbure o£ bhe aumaary execubion o£ a guerrilla by a

^Honore Boneb, The Tree of Babtlea. brana., G. W.
Coopland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univeraiby Preaa, 1949>, p.
79.
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Vietnomeae police chief^ and the sickening stories of hurl
ing some prisoners of war from a helicopter nine hundred or
a thousand feet in the air so that the survivors sight be

interrogated sore easily^ speak vividly of the lack of sorality on sodern battlefields.

Have we then reached the stage

in the developsent of warfare where the conduct of war suat
be devoid of sorality?

This thesis seeks to answer a portion of that question.

Its attention is directed to the question of what soral pre

cepts, if any, should guide the field cossander in his con
duct of anti-guerrilla operations.
This thesis approaches this question fros the perspec
tive of Lutheran ethics as well as fros the Lutheran under

standing of the appropriate place and task of civil governsent
in God's rule of this world.

This thesis, then, stands clearly within the frasework

of Lutheran systesatic theology.

However, its findings are

not lisited thereby in their application.

The rules of sil-

itary conduct developed in the course of this investigation

are applicable to all field cossanders—regardless of their
theological, philosophical, or political orientation—who

^Robert Thospson, ed.. War in Peace! Conventional
and Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945. (New York: Harsony Books,
1982>, p. 192.

3Nark Barker, ed. Was! The Vietnas War in the Words
of the Men and Nosen Who Fought There. (New York! Berkley
Books, 19d3>, p. 186.
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seek a mlllt,ary vict.ory over a foe £ight.lng a guerrilla cam
paign agalnat. t.hem.

In lt.a opening chapt.ara^ t.he t.haaia will inveat.igat.e

t.he phenomenon of warfare.

It will aeek to ahow how warfare

ia related to geo-political conaiderationap and it will
atrive to ahow the relationahip of grand atrategy# strategyp

tacticsp and logistics in the conduct of warfare.

No at

tempt will be made to provide a thorough explanation of any
one of these fields; insteadp an attempt will be made to

provide enough rudimentary knowledge so that the reader will
be able to grasp the practicality of ethical decisions diacuaaed later.

The narrower aubsect of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla
warfare will also be discussed.

The purpoae here will be to

give the reader a grasp of the unique nature of guerrilla
warfare and of its strategic and tactical concepts.

Guerrilla warfare is aimed at a government in being.

It is an attempt to bring about the eventual overthrow of
that governmentp whether it be government by the army of an

occupying foreign power or a domestic civil government lack
ing the approval of the guerrilla force.

Consequentlyp

counter-guerrilla warfare is waged by forces seeking to sup

port and to maintain in place a government that they see to
be the rightful governing body in that locality.
These factors underline the importance of examining

the place of civil government in Lutheran thought.

Thia
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will be done by firat providing e brief hlaborlcel aurvey

of t-heologlcal theorlea of governaent. prior to Hartin Luther.
Luther'a teaching concerning civil governaent and the appro-

prlate relatlonahlp between the church and the atate aa well
aa hla teachlnga concerning the dutlea of the Chrlatlan cit
izen will be aet forth on the baala of hla own wrltlnga.

Lutheran thought alnce Luther on these aubjecta will be ex

plicated on the baala of the Lutheran Confeaaiona and the
wrltlnga of aelected alxteenth and seventeenth century ortho
dox Lutheran theologians.

Having exaalned Lutheran thinking on the general sub
ject of the appropriate function of governaent^ attention
will be focused specifically on warfare.

Again» by means of

an historical survey^ the thesis will show the development
of the three characteratic reactions to war among Chrlatlan

theologians^ reactions that are encapsulated In the concepts

of pacifism, the cruaade, and the just war.

The just war

teaching of Luther and of the orthodox Lutheran theologians
will be examined In some detail.

The final chapter of the thesis will be devoted to an

application of the just war teaching of Luther and of the
orthodox Lutheran theologians to the problems of waging an
effective counter-guerrilla campaign.
As will be seen. In times past—In fact. In times aa
recent as the era of the second world war--there have been

rules of morality that have applied to battlefields and that
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hove been observed by eombobonbe.^

In bhe oouree of bhe de-

velopnent of this theaia, the ahape and the aubatance of
those rules from medieval timea to the middle of the present

century will be explored.

The relationship, if any, between

the rules actually in place and observed by combatants to
those rules suggested by the theology of the Christian
church will be examined.

The ma3or task of this thesis will be to set forth

clearly and in detail the idea of a ^ust war that grows out
of the Lutheran theology of church and state as that theol

ogy was developed from the time of the reformation to the
close of the golden period of Lutheran orthodoxy.

From this

concept of a just war the thesis will then develop moral
rules applicable to the conduct of those engaged in waging
counter-guerrilla warfare, and it will seek to demonstrate
the practicality and applicability of these rules.

Formulating theorectical rules for conduct on the
battlefield is a task of no great intellectual accomplish

ment.

It is a task that is performed all the time by people

utterly ignorant of the demands of military leadership and
devoid of any desire to acquire first-hand knowledge of the
risks in the modern guerrilla warfare environment.

Anyone

^Farley Nowat mentions a truce arranged between German
and Canadian infantry units fighting in the hamlet of San
Maria di Scacciano, Italy, on the afternoon of 4 September
1944; see his The Regiment (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1981), pp. 217-18.
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at. all may pontificate concerning how a soldier should behave
in battle.

The task that requires careful investigation and

diligent study is the task of providing the battlefield connander with moral rules and guidelines that will allow him^
or better^ will enable him to function effectively as a
battlefield commander and military leader.

an attempt to perform this second task.

This thesis is

CHAPTER 11

THE NATURE OF WARFARE

Grand S-bra-beav

Carl von Clauaewit.z defined war aa a duel conducted

on an extenalve acale in which each opponent, by aeana of

violence, eeeka to force the other to comply with hia will.^
However, war ia never an isolated event.

It ariaea out of

and exiata in the hiatory of mankind aa well aa the history

of the particular tribes, factions, or nations who are the
combatanta.

Thus there ia far more to the goals of the re-

apective combatants than merely "winning the war."^

In fact.

^Carl von Clauaewitz, On War. 3 vola. (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 1:3-4.

^Clauaewitz, On War. 1:7-13, and 3:76-140 as well.
See alao Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Mac-

millan Publiahing Co., 1973>, pp. 1-11; B. H. Liddell Hart,
Strateov (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 15; Mao

Tse Tung, "Problema of Strategy in China's Revolutionary
War," in Selected Militarv Writings of Mao Tae-Tunq (Peking:
Foreign Language Press, 196d>, pp. BO-dl; Baron de Jomini,
The Art of War (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott and Co., 1862;
reprint ed., Weatport, CT: Greenwood Preaa, Publishers,
n.d.>, pp. 12-13, which contains a simplified list of the
political motives for going to war; Raymond Aron, On War
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1938), pp. 1-6; and
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (Mew York: Columbia
University Preaa, 1961>, pp. 1-14, which contains an unusu
ally good diacuaaion of the various currents of national
foreign and domestic policy that can affect military policy
in times both of peace and of war.
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-the particlpanta in a war have gone to war precisely to gain
some political end or to prevent their opponent fro* gaining
some political end.

As Clauaewitz concluded, **We see, there

fore, that War ia not merely a political act, but alao a
real political instrument, a continuation of political com
merce, a carrying out of the same by other means.
The co-ordination and direction of the total reaourcea

of a political entity or a combine of political entities to
ward the attainment of the political ob3ect of a war ia

called "grand strategy."^

Grand strategy employs other

weapons beaidea fighting power, weapons that may fall en
tirely outside the purview of military action, weapons such
as diplomatic pressure, appeal to the appropriate interna

tional tribunal, commercial boycott, and the like.^

More

over, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the peace it la
hoped will follow the war and strives so to direct the war

that the peace will assume the shape desired.^

Goals estab

lished by grand strategy may, upon subsequent re-examination,
be discovered to be unattainable.

In this case, new goals

^lausewitz. On War. 1:23.

^Hart, Strategy. pp. 335-36-

^amuel P. Huntington, "Military Policy," in Inter
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 18 vols. <Mew

York: the Macmillan Company, 1968>, 10:319. See also Henry
E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy (New Brunswick,

NJ: The Rutgers Uniyeraity Press, 1965>, p. 28.

^Hart, Strategy - pp. 335-36.

See also p. 150.
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jRue-t then be eetabXiehed.'^

Hitler

failure to re>exaaine

his situation and to set new goals after the British Army as

well as portions of the French Army slipped from his grasp
at Dunkirk in 1940 and his consequent utter defeat only

underline the importance and the necessity of such a review.

In most states, the formulation of grand strategy does
not lie in the hands of the military leaders.

Because these

are matters of national purpose, they generally are the con
cern of the highest deliberative authority in the land.
Such is true, for instance, in the case of the United States,

whose Constitution grants to the Congress the right "to de
clare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; to raise and

support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use
shall be for a longer term than two Years; to provide and
maintain a Navy; to make Rules for the Government and Regu
lation of the land and naval Forces; to provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress

Insurrections and repel Invasions; to provide for organ

izing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for gov
erning such Part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States. . .

A political entity does not practice grand strategy

"^Eccles, Concepts, p. 52.
^U. S. Constitution« Art. I, Sec. 8.

lO

only in t.iiiie o£ war.

In t.li»ea o£ peace/ a at.at.e at.111 aeeka

t.o ob'tain varioua poli'bical advanbages.

Thus/ a polibical

enbiby ia continually practicing grand atrategy/ even in
timea o£ peace when it neither is involved in any interna

tional diaputea nor contemplates any such involvement.

The

guidance o£ a nation's £oreign policy is closely tied to the
putting into action that nation's plans o£ grand strategy.
However/ this does not demand that £oreign policy include
hostilities or overt threat o£ military action.

S^yategy
"Strateav ia the art o£ comprehensive direction
o£ power to control situations and areas in order to at

tain obiectivea.^

It ha© also been defined a© "the art of

distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends

of policy."^^

Thus pure or military strategy deal© with the

carrying out of the military tasks assigned to the armed
forces by the makers of grand atrategy.

Strategy determines

and controls how the military goals of grand strategy will
be achieved on the battlefield.

There ia always the possibility for friction and poor

management and poor leadership at those points in an organi
zation where control passes from a higher level to a lower
one.

The subordinate level may tend to take too much control

^EccleS/ Concepts, p. 48.

l^Hart/ Strategy. p. 335.
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t.o lt.sel£^ t.hua forcing t.he hand o£ hhe superior and. In

effect, cont.rolllng t.he decisions and policy t.he superior
nakes.

On the other hand, the superior may so tightly con

trol the subordinate that the latter will not have sufficient

authority to perform the routine tasks of management and
leadership.

By maintaining too tight a control on his

subordinate, the superior will be the actual manager at both
his level and the level of his subordinate, and the subordi

nate will be relegated to becoming merely a messenger for
his superior.

The more Important the tasks being controlled,

the more critical the management and the less tolerable this
friction becomes.

Military tasks generally deal with the very existence
of a nation.

When we consider the chain of command and re

sponsibility from the top down, we see that control passes

from the higher level of grand strategy to the subordinate
level of strategy.

It Is not at all uncommon for difficul

ties to develop at this junction.

Henry E. Eccles has given some criteria to assist In
establishing the boundary of command and responsibility be

tween the grand etrateglet and the military strategist.H
He pointed out that the military strategist should be expe
rienced In the realm of military matters so that he will

poasess a knowledge of what la militarily possible and what

^^Eccles, Concents, pp. 24-26.
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la not..

The man who haa led troopa in t.he field under fire

ia bet.t.er able tio render an unbiaaed 3udgment. on a at.rat.egic

plan t.han t.he acient.iat. who ia cerbain hhat. hia invention
repreaent.a t.he great.eat. advance in t.he hiat.ory of weaponry
or t.he ababeaaan whoae pat.riot.ic pride haa been wounded by
-the aucceaaea of the eneny.

Ecclea alao wrote, *'A aenae of peraonal reaponaibility

for -the outcone of a deciaion or a plan playa a vital part

in ita correct formulation."^2

jt, is obvious that a person

exercises more care when hia reputation or even hia life ia
at stake in the outcome of the deciaion he ia about to make.

Thus it ia well for the strategist to have a peraonal stake
in the outcome of hia atrategic decisions.

Since this ia

true, it ia preferable to have atrategic deciaiona made at
as low a level of command aa ia commensurate with the knowl

edge, experience, and acope of command sufficient to accom
plish the proposed task.

It ia common practice to allow the commander of the

army in the field to determine what atrategic plans he will
make in order to achieve the goala eatabliahed for the mili
tary by the nation's grand strategy.

If the field commander

cannot formulate and carry out strategy that ia in line with

the goala of grand strategy, it ia uaual that he ia removed
and another commander ia inatalled.

i2ibid., p. 26.

An example of this
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occured when President. Harry S. Truman removed General Douglas
NacArt.hur from t.he command of -the United Nat.lona Forces in

Korea in 1951-13
It has happened, however, that those in control of

grand strategy fail to allow their subordinates sufficient
latitude in the formulation of strategy.

can be dangerous for a number of reasons.

Such "over-control"

The maker of grand

strategy may have an exceedingly clear idea of the political
goals being sought in the war but only a hazy understanding
of the military means available and the military maneuvers

suitable to achieving those goals as well as an ignorance of
military matters in general.

In such a case, his strategic

commands will be the result of ignorance rather than knowl

edge.

He may formulate his strategic considerations on the

basis of an evaluation of the situation distorted by his
distance from the scene of conflict and by his desire to

achieve certain political goals; in such cases his strategic
commands will be baaed upon faulty premises.

Moreover, his

subordinates will be inclined to carry out such orders with

less than complete dedication and enthusiasm, for they will

^3ibid., p. 295.

For a professional soldiers record

and evaluation of that episode, see Omar N. Bradley and Clay

Blair, A General^a Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983),
pp. 521-642. Much information of value is to be found in
Joseph C. Goulden, Korea! The Untold Storv of the War (New
York: Times Books, 1982), pp. 382-545. An analysis from the
point of view of the president is to be found in Margaret
Truman, Harrv S. Truman (New York: William Morrow and Com
pany, 1973), pp. 503-20.
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have had llt.t.le or not-hlng t.o do wlt.h t.he £ormulat.lon of

■thoae orders^ and t.heir superior millt.ary knowledge may well
bell bhea bhab bhe orders simply are nob feasible.
The rebreab of bhe German armies from Russia in

1943-

44 offers several inberesbing cases of over-conbroiling of

milibary leaders by bhe polibical commander-in-chief.
Hibler repeabedly ordered bhe generals of his armies in bhe
easb bo aband and fighb and under no circumabancea bo conaider rebreab.

In many insbancea where bheae orders were

obeyed, bhe German armies were enbrapped, suffering sbag-

gering losses in men and maberial.

In obher cases, bhe

milibary aubordinabea inbenbionally disobeyed Hibler's or
ders, wibhdrawing bheir armies bo bebber posibions chosen

on bheir superior knowledge of sbrabegy.

Ofben on bhese

occasions bhe abbacks of bhe Russians were slowed or bempo-

rarily halbed.^^
Tacbics

Tacbics is "bhe immediabe emolovmenb of specific forces

I'^Harb, Sbrabegy. pp. 293-99, 311-14.

Informabion

of value concerning bhis aspecb of German operabions in World
War II is also bo be found in J. F. C. Fuller, The Decisive
Babbles of bhe Wesbern World, ed. John Terraine, 2 vols.

(London: Granada Publishing, 1970), 2:503-529; Peber
Calvocoressi and Guy Winb, Tobal War (New York: Panbheon

Books, 1972>, pp. 447-463; and Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader
(London: Fubura Publicabions, 1972>, pp. 242-71 and 311-326,
352-79.
For a rabher differenb evaluabion, see P. N.

Pospelov, ed. Greab Pabriobic War of bhe Sovieb Union (Moscow!
Progress Publishers, 1974>.

IS

and weapons to attain the obieotives of etrateav.^S
tics ia related to strategy as hemner is to hand.

Tac

Strategy

is expressed in terns of comprehensive control of a military
situation; tactics is the immediate employment of force and
weapons.

The distinction between strategy and tactics is one

that ia poorly understood^ and the designation of much of

modern weaponry only clouds the issue further.

A missile ia

a tactical weapon^ regardless of its size and destructive
power, because the exploding of a missile warhead is an

immediate application of force in a limited area for a lim
ited period of time.
of tactics.

The employment of a missile is a part

The ultimate effect to be achieved by the em

ployment of that weapon and others like it, coupled with the
application of various other forms of force, is strategic.
Eccles pointed out, "The size and power of any weapon should
not be considered as the criteria that determines its pro-

pietary right to ^strategy' or the term ^strategic.'

Such

semantic confusion inevitably leads to confused thinking.

ISEccles, Concents. p. 70.
^^Eccles, Concents, pp. 46-50.

See also Clauswitz,

On War. 1:66.

^''Eccles, Concents. p. 46.
On War. 1:94.

See also Clauswitz,
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Logiat.iea la **t.he bridge between the economy of the
nation and the tactical operations of the combat forces.

It Includes the deagln, development, and supply of weaponry
to the fighting man aa well aa providing him with those

Items he may need for the support of life and for trans

porting him and his equipment to the battlefield.

The drab,

unglamorous science of logistics Is a necessary part of stra
tegic knowledge.

**The practical application of a strategic

concept consists of a group of specific tactical operations
that must be preceded by logistical operations.

The Importance of logistics to the overall conduct of
a war can be readily realized by recalling the War Between
the States.

The Confederacy would have been able to develop

a viable strategy had she been able to solve her problems of

logistics.

Her armies displayed superior tactical skills,

but her civil and military leaders were never able to give

those armies the logistical support they required, and thus
they were ultimately defeated.

The

It Is on the strategist that the main weight of waging
war falls.

It Is he who selects the military means, draws

up the plans, and controls, the operations so that the goals

^^Eccles, Concepts, p. 72.

l^Ibld., p. 49.
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o£ grand 8t.rat.egy are attained.

Aa he goes about these

taaka, he drawa upon the storehouse o£ hia military knowl

edge so aa to attain the desired results in the manner most
advantageous to his side.

It is the paradox o£ modern military science that the
strategist seeks to reduce the amount o£ actual combat to a
minimum i£, in fact, he is not able to do away with combat

altogether•

However, i£ we remember that the strategist

seeks the attainment o£ his appointed goals with the least

possible cost to hia own £orcea, it will then become obvious
that i£ a victory can be won without a battle this is the
goal o£ strategy.

In practice, the complete absence o£ combat in a war

is rarely possible, but there have been some noteworthy in
stances where appropriate strategy and tactics reduced the
amount o£ combat to a minimum.

Recent examples include the

German isolation o£ the Allied le£t wing in Belgium a£ter

Guderian'a breakthrough in the center o£ the lines at Sedan

in 1940,2^ and the surrounding and subsequent defeat of the
20Hart, Strategy. pp. 337-38.

21lbid., p. 338.

For a first-hand account of this

campaign that includes a careful explanation of the tactics
of the campaign, see Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 89-117.
Len Deighton provides a well written account of the entire
campaign, including the diplomatic manuevera prior to the be
ginning of hostilities as well aa the invasions of Poland and
Norway, thereby providing a valuable overall perspective in
his Blitzkrieg (London: Granada Publishing, 1979).

Walter

Lord provides an eminently readable account of the subsequent
evacuation in his The Miracle of Dunkirk (New York: The Viking
Press, 1982).

Id

Egyptian army in the Sinai Peninsula by the Israelis in the

Six Day War of 1967.22
There are many different ideas concerning whether any

abiding principles say be discerned froa a study of military
strategy.

Some would tell us that a study of the history

and theory of military strategy is a task made fruitless by

the introduction of modern military hardware.23

The late

British military historian and strategist^ B. H. Liddell
Hart, would have and, in fact, often did strenuously debate
such naysayers.

From his extensive studies of military

strategy. Hart formulated what he has called the strategy of

the indirect approach.2^^
Speaking in the simplest terms, the strategy of the
indirect approach dictates that the military commander should
seek to control circumstances so that his opponent will be

placed at such a great disadvantage militarily that battle

will be for him diea6terou6.25
Hart's concept of the indirect approach differs radi
cally from the prevailing theme of military strategy since

the middle of the eighteenth century.

Clausewitz, the great

Prussian military genius, would have scorned the idea of the

22^, j, Xotsch, "The Six-Day War of 1967," The
United States Naval Institute Proceedings. June 1966, pp. 7261.

23Eccles, Concents. p. 24.

24Hart, Strategy. p. 16.

p. 339,
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Indirect, approach.

He waa an ardent, advocate o£ seeking

battle aa the aeana of coming to a military decision; hia

was a strategy characterized by directness
Hart does not claim originality for hia idea of the

strategy of the indirect approach.

He cites authorities as

ancient as the sixth century B. C. Chinese strategist^ Sun
to show that this is an ancient and accepted concept.

Nor have all the great German military leaders eschewed the
strategy of the indirect approach.

Hart quoted Helmuth

von Moltke, "A clever leader will succeed in many cases in

choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature

from the strategic point of view that the enemy is compelled

to attack us in them.**^^

This statement provides a perfect

example of the indirect approach; the enemy is attacked by
being placed in a position such that they are compelled to

26lbid., p. 338.

See also Clausewitz^ On War. 1:

27-39. There^ as elsewhere# Clausewitz explains# **We have
only one means in War--the Battle.*'

27Hart# Strategy. p. 13.

The idea of a strategy of

indirect approach seems to have been a fairly common oriental
approach to warfare as well as to single combat. Aa an ex
ample# Miyamoto Musashi# the early seventeenth century sam
urai# writes of breaking the rhythm of the opponent and of
thereby compelling him to fight in the manner in which you
wish him to fight. This idea of compelling your opponent to
wage war on your terms and as you dictate rather than in the
manner that would be advantageous to him is a major tenet
of the strategy of the indirect approach. See Miyamoto
Musashi# The Book of Five Rings, trans. Nihon Services Cor
poration (New York: Bantam Books# 1982># pp. 23-24; SO-51;
61-63.

26Hart# Strategy. p. 14.
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aaaault. our prepared poait-iona or loae t.he bat.'tle--and perhapa t.he war—by default..

The object of the atrategy of the Indirect approach
la to achieve atrateglc dlalocatlon, that la^ to place the

eneny In a altuatlon where a further continuation of that
altuatlon by hla joining battle would be dlaaateroua.

Hart

pointed out that thla night be accoapllahed In a number of

ways.^^

Thus, In a geographic or physical aenae# an Indirect

approach might dlalocate the distribution and organization
of an enemy's armlea by appearing In a location that re
quires the enemy to defend himself from a new direction
Another such approach might threaten to fragment the enemy's

forcea and thus prepare the way for their piecemeal destruc
tion.

Or, a move might be made that would endanger the

enemy's auppllea or threaten to cut off hla avenue of re
treat.

Any of these manuevera would produce a physical dis

location of the enemy's forcea and call upon him to realign
hla army or withdraw from the field entirely.
However, the atrategy of the Indirect approach con

tains a subtlety that la not apparent at flrat glance.

The

29lbld., p. 339-40.
3^he Increased Viet Cong activity in Cambodia In
late February and early March, 1970, appears to have been an
example of an Indirect approach of thla nature. For deacrlptlona of the eventa of that spring, aee Stanley Karnow, Viet
nam! A Hiatorv (New York! The Viking Preaa, 1983), pp. 60210, and Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Dav War (Toronto!
Methuen Publications, 1981>, pp. 290-98.

21

at.rat.egy o£ t.he Indirect, approach ia aimed at. t.he will o£
t.ha enemy, £or it. ia t.hia conatit.uent. o£ hia £ight.ing £orce
which muah be deebroyed before victory will follow

The

retreata o£ the Ruaaian armiea in ldl2 and 1941 ahow that

vaat amounta of territory may be aurrendered while fighting
force remaina.

The "punji atick," a piece of alivered bam

boo ameared with human fecea and driven into the bottom of a

ditch or rice paddy or poaitioned in a puddle beaide a trail,

provea that wara can be waged with a bare minimum of logiatic
aupport.

However, when the will to reaiat ia broken, aa waa

that of the Ruaaian army in 1918, or the left wing of the
allied forcea in Belgium in 1940, reaiatance melta away.
The hiatory of Canada providea an intereating example

of thia general rule.

In the French and Indian War, General

Jamea Wolfe, commanding the Britiah forcea, reaorted to

every atrategem at hia command in order to avoid a coatly
direct aaaault on the French forcea in their fortificationa

at the Citadel in Quebec. All elae failing, Wolfe diacovered

a path leading to the Plaina of Abraham adoacent to the fortreaa, and he determined that if he muat aaaault the fortreaa
he would attack from that direction.

Under cover of night,

Wolfe landed hia army, and by dawn the Britiah force waa

drawn up in battle array on the Plaina of Abraham, facing

^^Hart, Strategy. pp. 18-19, 24-25, 107-08; eee
alao Ecclea, Concenta. pp. 244-52, and Mao Tae Tung, "On
Protracted War," in Selected Military Writinoa. p. 260.
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-the fortress.

The French sallied forth fron the Citadel to

drive the British fron their positions and were defeated in

the subsequent battle.

In retrospect^ there seems to be no

clear reason why the French had to come out and fight when
they did, if, indeed, they needed to come out and give
battle at all.

It was already late in the year, and the

French needed to withstand a siege of, at the moat, a few
weeks before weather and short provisions would have com

pelled Wolfe and his army to retire.

However, the psycho

logical shock of discovering the enemy where he had no busi
ness to be precipitated the French command into the hasty
and desperate attack that was their undoing.
Abraham's victory over the army of the four kings re

corded for us in Scripture^^ is also an illustration of this
concept.

After Abraham's successful raid on the weakest

part of the enemy's column, he was open to a devastating
counter-attack from a force that must have greatly outnum

bered his.

However, the four kings were so psychologically

shocked by the suprise and success of Abraham's small force

that they considered discretion the better part of valour

32seo Hart, Strategy. pp. 107-108.

For more de

tailed accounts of the campaign, see George W. Brown, Building
the Canadian Nation 2 vola. <New York: Macfadden-Bartell

Corp., 1968), 1:150-55; Gordan Donaldson, Battle for a Conti
nent (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1973); and Francis Parkman,
The Conspiracv of Pontlac 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1913), 1:126-41.

^^jenesis 14:1-16.
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and continued their retreat rather than mount a counter
attack.

Thua, the primary point of aim of any appropriate mil

itary strategy ia the will of the enemy to resist.

The

sooner this will to resist can be broken, the sooner will

the war be over and the peace begun.

It is often true that

a great number of enemy soldiers must be killed, a great

portion of the enemy economic power destroyed or rendered
useless, and a great amount of enemy territory occupied be
fore this will to resist ia broken.

However, the strategist

who shifts his over-all aim from breaking the will of the

enemy to some secondary goal such as the destruction of the
enemy's army is majoring in minors and may find himself in
no little difficulty.

An illustrative example of this fact of military life

is the comparison of the manner in which the Russians put
down the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the manner in

which they quelled the Czechoslovakian uprising of 1966.

In

Hungary, the Russian field commanders sought purely military
victories over the students dug in on Castle Hill in Buda
and the workers barracaded in the factories and refineries

on the island of Csepel in the Danube just south of

Budapest.

In Prague, the Russians avoided military action

3^For a carefully written account of the Hungarian
Revolution, see James A. Hichener, The Bridge at Andau (New
York: Bantam Books, 1957>.
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whenever t.hey could ae£ely be avoided ^ seeking rebher t.o

make an Impressive show of force

In Hungary» bhere was

continued alllt.ary action for several weeks^ resulting In

widespread damage and serious casualItlea; as long as the
fight raged, the Hungarians clung to the hope that they
might win.

On the other hand, the refusal of the Russians

to be provoked Into battle In Prague communicated to the
Czechs and the Slovaks the utter hopelessness of their situ

ation; the Russians were In such complete control that they
could not be disturbed by provocations.

To bring about the dislocation of the enemy and their
ultimate defeat, the strategic command has many resources at

his disposal.

Before he can consider what combination of

these resources to employ he must first consider the nature

of the enemy and the conditions under which he Is to achieve

the goals established for him by those In charge of grand
strategy.

Subsequently, the strategic commander establishes

the purely military goals of his campaign.
It Is possible to establish differing military goals
In the course of the task of realizing the goals that grand

strategy has established for the military.

Thus, If grand

strategy would direct that a certain area be wrestled from
j, Kotsch, "The Tanks of August 1968," The
United States Naval Institute Proceedings. May 1968, pp. 8893.

3^Ecc1os, Concents. p. 18.
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enemy occupat.ion^ front.el esaault, might, be the only solution
in one instance while a naval blockade o£ the harbors of the

territory might be the best answer in another.

And it is

possible that both of these courses of action might be pro
posed as the correct strategy in the same situation.
Utilizing his experience, his knowledge of military
history, his evaluation of his own resources and those of
his enemy,

as well as his conception of what is allowable

morally in the waging of war,3® the strategic commander es
tablishes strategic goals and prescribes the tactics and
resources that will be used to achieve these goals.

Among the resources that the strategic commander may
have at his disposal is the advantage of the terrain.

The

strategic commander may be able to position his forces in
terrain which lends itself readily to defense or he may be

able to place them along some easily defensible natural
barrier such as a river, while his opponent may en^oy no

such advantage.

In the words of Colonel Eugene Stann,

Switzerland and Poland furnish clear examples.
Switzerland has strong mountain barriers at its perim
eter and has been able to continue as an independent
state because access is extremely difficult. Relatively

easy defense has allowed the Swiss nation to remain se
rene in the midst of epic struggles between France,

Italy, and Germany. Poland, on the other hand, is his
torically a military pushover in spite of the fortitude
of the Polish people, because her borders afford

37Ibid., p. 24.

38ibid., pp. 32-34.
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excellent, mobility end occeaa on several sides
Another resource which the strategic commander must

consider is the military hardware at his disposal.

Assur

edly, strategy is influenced by the availability and nature
of weapons, but strategy should determine the choice of
weapons and not weapons the choice of strategy.
The resource which the strategic commander possesaea

which is most often overlooked by the person not acquainted
with military leadership are the men who form the army the
commander leads.

Overlooked as this resource may be, it

is of the utmost importance.

Mew weapons may be purchased

or forged if the old ones are lost.

New forms of warfare

may be undertaken if no territory remains for the waging of
conventional war.

But once an army is lost, once the re

source of manpower is gone, it takes years to replace, even
if one considers only the biological factors involved.
However, there is more to the loss of an army than

merely the biological loss.

Those men who have been killed.

^^Eugene J. Stann, then Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Mobility Command, Warren, Michigan, "Remarks Concerning the
Need for Strategic and Tactical Mobility," speech delivered
at the Opening Dinner of the Fifteenth Annual Armed Forces
Week, Detroit, Michigan, May 4, 1964.

^^^ccles. Concept. p. IS.

'^^Compare General George S. Patton's comment, "Although
wars may be fought with weapons, they are won by men. It is
the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that
gains the victory," quoted by Reginald Hargreaves in "Victory
to the Stronger,*' The United States Naval Institute Procedinas. April 1969, p. 84.
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wounded^ or capt.ured are brot.hera^ fat.hera^ and aona o£

t.hoae people who remain to carry on the fight.

If their

loaa haa been brought about by poor leaderships if the re

source of manpower ia squandered in ill-conceived military

operationss the will of the nation to fight ia destroyed.
Bearing this in mind, we see why the evacuation of
Dunkirk in 1940 waa of such tremendous value to the British

war effort.

It waa the army that had been saveds the men

who would fight on the beaches, in the fields, and in the
atreetSs if need be.

Even more heartening for the British

Spirits it was 224s000 brotherss fatherss and sons who
returned from the battlefield to defend their own homes.

Converselys et least some of the opposition in the
United States to the involvement of U. S. forces in Vietnam

may have stemmed from the feeling that the lives of American

fighting men were being squandered without purpose.

The

military leader who is inhumane or injudicious in the use of
his human resources seldom prospers.

^^For a contemporary measure of this disaffection, see
Ian Wright, "American's Army of Doubters," Manchester Guardian
Weeklv. 17 January 1970.

CHAPTER III

GUERRILLA STRATEGY

InLroducLion

The laLe B. H. Llddell Hart, haa wrlLLen^ **If you wlah

for peace^ underaLand war--particularly the guerrilla and

subversive forms of war.**^

Hart went on to explain that the

current thermo-nuclear stalemate between the two greatest

world powers has called for the development and use of other

forms of conflict.^
The concept of guerrilla warfare haa been in existence
since antiquity.

As Gerard Chaliand writes.

Guerrilla warfare has consistently been the choice of

the weak who oppose the strong, for it enables them to
avoid direct decisive confrontations and rely on harass

ment and suprise.^
^B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1967), p. 373.

^Ibid., pp. 375-382.

Hart here provides a thoughtful

investigation of the longterm results of provoking or sup
plying guerrillas in an insurrection or a revolutionary con
flict. Gerard Chaliand provides a well written study of the
historical, sociological, military, and political reasons
why guerrilla warfare has become increasingly prevalent
since World War II in Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gerard

Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982),
pp. 3-29. Douglas Hyde discusses the present condition of
Communist guerrilla movements and their prospects for the
future in The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare (London: The Bodley

Head, 1988), pp. 149-59.

Thailand, Guerrilla Strategies, p. 1.
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Biblical examples of guerrilla-type actions In ancient
times Include the attack of Abraham and his small force on

the armies of the four kings mentioned In the previous chap
ter and Gideon's famous night attack on the Mldlanltes re

corded In the seventh chapter of Judges.

Ablmllech's ambush

of the Schechemltes recorded In the ninth chapter of Judges

was also a typical guerrilla action.
The term "guerrilla** originated In Spain when the

Spanish peasants took up arms against the armies of the
French and conducted Irregular warfare against them after

the Spanish armies had been soundly defeated.

While Spanish

peasants fought the troops of Napoleon In Spain^ Russian
peasants conducted Irregular warfare against Napoleon's army
In Russia.

In both cases, the French suffered severe losses.

In both cases, the guerrilla campaigns contributed to

Napoleon's subsequent defeat.^
Guerrilla warfare Is no foreigner to our shores.

The

campaign of the British General Edward Braddock In the
French and Indian War provides an outstanding example of how

a column of regulars can by Impeded, demoralized, and de

stroyed by guerrilla action.^
famine Rougeron, "The Historical Dimension of Guer
rilla Warfare," In Guerrilla Strategies, ed. Gerard
Challand, pp. 36-39.

^For an eyewitness account of this campaign, see Paul
HcClelland Angle, A New Continent and a New Nation (Green
wich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1960), pp. 115-ld.
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The campeigna of Lieu-tenant. Colonel Francis Marion in
South Carolina during the Revolutionary War provide another

exaaple of aucceaaful guerrilla warfare.

Marion set out to

break the will of the Loyalist troops and thereby to greatly
reduce the effectiveneaa of General Charles Cornwallia-'s

troops in the southern colonies.

Waging a very successful

guerrilla war, Marion compelled Cornwallis to use his regu

lar troops where before he had been able to rely on Loyalist
militia.

This, in turn, forced Cornwallis to concede con

trol of most of the uplands and concentrate on maintaining
his coastal lines of communication.

This, in its turn,

deprived Cornwallis of the forage that he needed to supply
his troops and horses.
withdraw northward.

As a result, he was compelled to

Perhaps the greatest harm was done to

morale of his troops who were compelled to surrender control

of large territories without having fought a major battle
for them.^

During the War Between the States, the Confederate
States employed guerrilla warfare in an attempt to disrupt

the invasion of the southern heartlands.'^
Guerrilla warfare has become a far more widespread

^Ray Palmer Baker, War in the Revolution (Washington
Depot, CT: Silver Mountain Press, 1976>, pp. 182-S3, 193-96,
213-15.

"^For a contemporary account of one such action, see
''Morgan's Guerrilla Raid Into Kentucky," Frank Leslie's
Illustrated Newspaper. 9 August 1862, p. 310.
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phenomenon in t.he second half of t.he t.went.iet.h cent.ury t.han
it has been ever before.

Considered from either the point

of view of the number of guerrilla conflicts being waged or

from the point of view of the number of people engaged in
guerrilla activity and counter-guerrilla activity, one must
conclude that guerrilla warfare is a far more prominent
feature of our times than it has been of any preceding era.

Several reasons have been suggested for this rise in

guerrilla activity.

Chaliand designates three historical

factors that have worked togther to produce the increased

guerrilla activity of the second half of the twentieth cen
tury, but his list does not seem exhaustive.
The first factor that Chaliand cites is what he calls

"the peasant question."^

Chaliand had noted that wherever

there has been vigorous guerrilla warfare directed against
an invader, the one common factor in all the cases was that

the warfare had been conducted by peasants.^
Camille Rougeron explains why this is so.

He writes

Relations between a starving soldier and a peasant who
will starve if he feeds him naturally tend to become
tense. . . .

. . . Guerrilla warfare is the reaction of the

peasant who is not paid when his cow or his wheat is
taken from him.

When the nation sounds a call to arms,

he may be willing to risk his life and that of his chil
dren for the cause, without grumbling too much in the

process; but there are limits to his forebearance.
is not 3uat in the songs that he prefers his two

^Chaliand, Guerrilla Strategies, pp. 7-9.

^Ibid., p. 8.
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reddaubed whlbe oxen t.o hia wife: he la willing bo die

defending bhen and will fight, for bhea wlbh an ardor

bhab no parbloblsn can ellclb.^^
Aa Challand polnba oub, lb waa Mao Tae-Tung who har-

neaaed bhla peaaanb abblbude Inbo a revolublonary pollblcal
and nlllbary force.

Mao made lb expllclb bhab

. . . guerrilla warfare la a nlllbary bacblc alned ab

haraaalng an adveraaryy whereaa revo1ublonary war la ^
nlllbary means whereby bo overbhrow a pollblcal regime.
Mao applied Lenin'a Idea of a vanguard parby leading bhe
revolublon bo bhe maaaea of peaaanba In China.

lb waa Mao

(and, aonewhab laber. Ho Chi Mlnh) who realized bhe revolu

blonary pobenblal of bhe peaaanb.

In ao doing, Mao gained

bhe vaab pollblcal aupporb bhab a guerrilla movenenb muab
have bo succeed.

The vaab numbers of dedlcabed peaaanba

provided a pool bhab could be pollblcally organized bo pro
vide flghbera, bearera, and bhe minimal loglablc aupporb
bhab bhe guerrlllaa needed.
The second facbor bhab Challand menblona la bhe dla-

locablon broughb aboub by World War II.

The abbempb of bhe

Axla powera bo secure world domlnablon upaeb bhe equilibrium
among bhe major powera and opened bhe way for a number of

aucceaaful "people's revolublons."^^
Challand'a bhlrd facbor la an oubgrowbh of hla flrab

^^Rougeron, "Historical Dimension," pp. 38-39.
^^Challand, Guerrilla Sbrabeglea. p. 11.

12ibld., p. 7-8.

13lbid., p. 8
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two.

In the decode immediately following World War II, the

Western colonial powers lost virtually their entire empires.
As revolutionary movements developed In colonies, the former

colonial powers. In moat cases, resisted half-heartedly If
at all.

Not only were the resources of the colonial powers

depleted by the global war they had 3ust fought.

It became

more and more common for significant portions of the elec
torate In the colonial countries to decide that colonialism

was oar se a wrongful state.

The people In the colonies

no longer accepted the status of "colonials** for they saw It
to be Immoral, degrading, and Iniquitous.

Given this un

stable situation. It was often the case that the first sign
of a serious revolutionary movement prepared to wage guer
rilla war for the cause of freedom was enough to cause the

colonial power to relinquish Its hold on the colony.

Given

the weakness of the old colonial powers, the costliness of

waging war In the colony, and the unllkllhood of achieving

any suitable military solution, granting colonies their In
dependence wae the only course of action that made sense.
The rapid success of some of the colonial campaigns

for Independence encourage Imitation among other colonies.
What was not always seen clearly was that many of the col
onies had not won guerrilla campaigns; Instead they had won

purely political campaigns for Independence using the threat

l^ibid., p. 9.
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of a guerrilla campaign aa one of their major weapona.
Moreover, It la well to remember that no colony or ex-

colony haa won a guerrilla war agalnat a major power who waa
willing to commit all of Ita military raaourcea to carrying
out an appropriate counter-guerrilla campaign.

In fact, a

dlaaldent faction aeeklng to overthrow an eatabllahed gov
ernment with the will and the ability to devote Itaelf to a
wholehearted counter-Insurgency campaign faces a very, very

difficult task, for It la virtually certain that the dissi
dents will need to achieve complete military victory In

order to achieve their political ends, and this Is alien to
the nature of guerrilla movements.

Revolutionary Strategy

Aa a matter of fact, revolutionary movements take up

guerrilla warfare precisely because they see themselves as
unable--at that time—to gain a complete military victory.

Guerrilla warfare, properly conducted In appropriate circum

stances, offers disproportionate rewards, measured against
the effort put forth by the guerrillas.

This Is true be

cause all too often the government In place seeks to deal

with revolutionary guerrillas through the use of conven
tional military tactics and techniques.

These are rela

tively ineffective against the guerrilla.

in addition.

^^oger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist
Tactic," In The Guerrilla--And How to Flaht Him, ed. T. N.
Greene <New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 25. See
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guerrilla warfare ia a-tt-ractlve -to -the revolut.ionary because

it. requires a far smaller inveabment. in money and ot.her re

sources than would a conventional war.^^
The strategic goal of guerrilla warfare ia to disrupt

or prevent the control of an area and its population by the
conventional forces and the law-enforcement agencies of the

enemy.

Through the use of hit-and-run tactics and am

bushes# the guerrillas hope to wear down their opponent

physically and mentally as well as to discredit him as the
ruling force in the area under contention.
In order for the political power using guerrilla war

fare to become the legitimate government# the guerrilla war

must progress gradually by steps (barring the assistance of
some outside military force) to a conventional war where the

guerrilla bands take on more and more the characteristics of

also Hart# Strategy. p. 375; Rowland S. N. Mans# "Victory in
Malaya#" in Greene# The Guerrilla, p. 120; Robert B. Asprey#
War in the Shadows; The Guerrilla in History 2 vols. (Garden

City# New York: Doubleday and Co.# 1975)# l:xiii-xiv; and
Douglas S. Blaufarb# The Counter-insurgency Era: U. S. Doc
trine and Performance 1950 to the Present (New York: The

Free Press# 1977)# pp. 22-51.

^^Kao Tse-Tung# "Guerrilla Warfare#" in Greene# The
Guerrilla, p. 10. See also Vo Nguyen Giap# "People's War#
People's Army" in The Military Art of People's War: Selected
Writings of General Vo Nguven Giao. ed. Russell Stetler (New

York: Monthly Review Press# 1970)# pp. 103-106.

l^Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare#" p. 7.

See also

his "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan#"
in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking:

Foreign Language Press# 1968)# pp. 153-57.
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convent.ional army unlt.a unt.ll at. laat. t.hey £orm a conven-

-tionol army in fact.^^

Ultimately, the guerrillas will

establish various governmental bureaus as they achieve more

complete control over the areas they occupy.

They will

begin to collect taxes and regulate commerce and education
wherever and whenever possible.

In so doing, they will be

demonstrating to the populace at large that they and not

their opponents are in fact the legitimate government of the
area.

Nao Tae-Tung is probably the moat aucceaaful guer
rilla leader of the twentieth century.

He has written volu

minously on the subject of people's war.

He stresses the

principle that the political organization of the populace
must proceed hand in hand with the consolidation of guer
rilla control over an area.

He wrote

The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting
but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses,
organize them, arm them, and help them to establish,
revolutionary political power. Without these objec
tives, fighting loses its meaning, and the Red Army

^^Mao Tse-Tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Hilitarv Writings, pp. 244-46; "Problems of War and Strategy,"
Selected Military Writings, pp. 269-73; and "Problems of Stra
tegy in China's Revolutionary War," Selected Military Writings
pp. 77-96. See also Vo Nguyen Giap, "People's War, People's
Army," Military Art, pp. 103-106; and Ho Chi Minh, "Message
to the Compatriots Throughout the Country on the Second Anni
versary of Independence Day," in Ho Chi Minh on Revolution.
ed. Bernard B. Fall (New York: The New American Library,
1966>, pp. 173-76.

l^E. L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Time, Space, and Will: the
Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung," in Greene, The
Guerrilla. p. 16-
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loeee bhe reason for ibs existence.

In an interview with the British journalist, Janes

Bertran, Mao said, "Another highly significant and distinctive feature of the Eighth Route Army is its political
work- . . ."21
Guerrilla operations, then, are but a single step on

the road to victory for the power that adopts this strategy.
Moreover, guerrilla tactics are sinply tactics, a technique

for immediate application of armed force in the attempt to
achieve some strategic gain.

By themselves, without a guid

ing political grand strategy, guerrilla operations degener
ate into simple terrorism and unbridled anarchy, into Thomas
Hobbes's celebrated war ". . .of every man, against every
man."

As Hobbes himself notes, the results of living in

such a condition is that the life of man becomes "solitary,

poor, nasty, brutish, and short."22
Students of guerrilla movements and critics of counter-

insurgency warfare must keep clearly in mind that the insur
gent forces do not seek to foment anarchy, however much
this may appear to be the case.

It is well to remind

20f|Qo Tse-Tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the
Party" in Selected Works of Mao-Tse Tuna. 4 vols. (Peking:
Foreign Language Press, 1967), 1:10G.

2lMao Tse-Tung, "Interview with the British Journalist
James Bertram, October 25, 1937," in Selected Works of Mao
Tse-Tung. 2:53.

22Thoma8 Hobbes, Leviathan. ed. Michael Oakeshott
(New York: Macmillan Publsihing Co., 1962), p. lOO.
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oneself often that the goal of the Insurgent is really a

relatively simple one.

He wishes to transfer the reins of

government from the hands that currently hold them Into his
own.

Guerrilla activities are merely a tactic In this

struggle, and upon careful examination It can be seen that
they are essentially a defensive tactic as opposed to an
offensive tactic.

Well conducted guerrilla operations can

stave off defeat virtually Indefinitely.

They can wear down

an enemy to the point of utter collapse.

However, In the

end, a conventional military occupation of territory Is

necessary for complete victory and establishment of the
revolutionary government.

Support of the Populace

Guerrilla operations require the acqulesence of. If
not the active support of, the populace among whom they are

being conducted.

Hao Tse-Tung underscores the Importance of

this support when he writes:

Many people think It Impossible for guerrillas to
exist for long In the enemy's rear. Such a belief
reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that
should exist between the people and the troops. The
former may be likened to water and the latter to the
fish who Inhabit It.

How may It be said that these two

cannot exist together? It la only undisciplined troops
who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish

out of its native element, cannot llve.^^
23Mflio Toe-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," pp. 6-7.

Mao

mentions this concept In other writings such as "Problems of
Strategy In China's Revolutionary War," Selected Mllltarv

39

Within certain limits, the guerrilla has time on his

side as long as he can remain active, £or each guerrilla
action, no matter how insignificant from a purely military

point of view, is another psychological blow against the
strength and sovereignty of the established government.

Each government official assassinated, each patrol ambushed,
each police car bombed, every act of terrorism serve to tell
the populace that their established, legitimate government
is incapable of maintaining law and order and that it is
weaker than the guerrilla forces seeking its overthrow (even
when this is not the case in fact.>

An exception to this

general rule occurs when it becomes obvious over a period of
Writings, pp. 113-14s "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War
Against Japan," Selected Militarv Writings, pp. 172-73; and
"On Protracted War," Selected Militarv Writings, pp. 260-61.
"The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for
Attention" issued by Mao in slightly different forma on
several occasions throughout the Chinese civil war and World
War II show that the idea of close co-operation between the

peasantry and the Red Army was more than merely a theory, as
far as Mao was concerned.

pp. 343-44. Ho
sity of popular
commendations,"
which served as

See Selected Militarv Writings,

Chi Minh echoes this principle of the neces
support in such writings as his "Twelve Re
Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, pp. 176-7,
general orders for the Viet Minh similar to

the use of the "Three Main Rules and Eight Points" in the

Chinese Red Army.

This theme is also found in Ho'a "In

structions Given at the Conference Reviewing the Second Le

Hong Phong Military Campaign," Ho Chi Minh on Revolution,
pp. 184-88; and his "teaching at the Meeting of Officers for
the Preparation of the Military Campaign in the Northwest,"
Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, pp. 226-30.

The tragic cir

cumstances now existing in Northern Ireland display the vast
amount of harm a guerrilla movement without widespread popu

lar support can wreak to absolutely no positive end. Maria
McGuire clearly displays the poverty of the I.R.A. strategy
from personal experience in her book To Take Arms! A Year in
the Provisional IRA

<London: Macmillan London, 1973).
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time that the guerrilla forces are so small in number and so

lacking in popular support that they cannot progress beyond

mere acts of terrorism,24
Guerrilla forces are capable of causing disruptions

of government functions and services well out of proportion
to their size and military power because the initiative is

generally theirs completely.

The guerrilla band chooses the

time, place, and type of action to be fought, and it always
plans to achieve overwhelming local superiority of force.
Furthermore, guerrilla forces may be extremely effec

tive by forcing their enemy into troop dispositions that are
diaasteroua for him.

If terrain and communicationa aitu-

ationa are auspicious, the enemy may be enticed into a

aeries of deployments in which he becomea increasingly im

mobile and his supply lines increasingly tenuous.

It was a

aucceaaful campaign of just this nature that T. E. Lawrence
and his Arab guerrilla army waged against the Turks in the
Arabian theater of World War I.

The Turks required their

horses in order to retain the mobility necessary to fight

Lawrence and his forces.

However, the Turks took up posi

tions so extended that Lawrence easily raided their supply

line, preventing fodder for the horses and food for the

24McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 138-57.

25Li Tso-Peng, Strategy: One Against Ten8 Tactics;
Ten Against One (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966, pp.
1-2.
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aoldlera from reaching the Turkiah army.

Hence, the Turka

were helpleasly bottled up In the atring o£ forta they had
conatructed, reduced to killing their horaea £or their

food-26
Depending upon the environment, logiatica may or may

not be a problem £or the guerrilla.

It ia here that the

aupport o£ the local population placea a critical role.
Guerrillaa muat eat.

0£ten their £ood ia purchaaed or

atolen £rom the local population.

However, the guerrilla

muat uae extreme care in extorting or atealing £ood leat he

dry up that aea o£ people in which he muat awim.

0£ten auppliea, weapona, medical £acilitiea, and even
trained peraonnel are aupplied to the guerrilla band by a

£oreign nation in aympathy with their aima.

I£ the £riendly

nation haa a common border with the operational area o£ the

guerrilla band, it may alao provide the guerrillaa with aa£e
baae areaa that are relatively immune to attack.
In order to achieve their atrategic goal o£ rendering

the enemy government in place impotent, guerrillaa will uae

a variety o£ tactica.

However, one characteriatic that ia

the hallmark o£ all guerrilla activitiea ia that o£ mobil'

ity.

Without mobility, the guerrilla £orce can be aought

26t. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillara of Wiadom <New York;
Dell Publiahing Company, 1962), pp. 190-314.
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out, pinned down, «nd destroyed -

It ia their mobility that allows guerrilla banda to
undertake a wide variety of operations aimed at undermining
the local government.

Single acta of terrorism such as

bombing or burning public buildinga or market places may be
resorted to when the guerrilla force ia small and cannot

afford any sort of confrontation with local law-enforcement
officials and supporting troops.

Larger guerrilla forces

will be employed in ambushes and raids on minor military
ob3ectivea.

Overwhelming local superiority will be the key to the
success of these operations.

The guerrilla force must al

ways maintain the highest degree of watchfulness when it ia
in the combat zone.

Through a network of informers and

agents it will strive to keep well posted on the status of
the enemy forces, their strength, and their intentions.

The

guerrilla force will strive to remain mobile, not allowing
itself to be surrounded by the hostile state security

forces.

Tactically, then, the guerrilla force must always

be on the offensive.

In order to be effective, the guerrilla force must
have a base area where it can store supplies, weapons, and

27che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare. (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1969>, pp. 23-24. See
also Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London:
Faber and Faber 1967>, pp. 25-26.

26Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," p. 7.
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ammunition, where it can rest and regroup in comparative

security, and where it can train ita members and plan opera
tions.

The guerrilla must be able to £eel relatively safe

when he is in his base area.^^

The Nature of the Guerrilla Soldier

Because the individual soldier is of greater relative

importance in waging guerrilla warfare than in waging con
ventional warfare,

it is helpful to investigate the char

acteristics of the average guerrilla.

The ideal guerrilla is an exceptionally young man^^
deeply committed to a cause.

Royalist, capitalist, or

communist, the guerrilla must feel that his case is just and

2^Mao Tse-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," p. 8.

See also

Mao Tse-Tung, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," in
Selected Militarv Writings, p. 140-41, and "On Protracted
War," pp. 220-22, as well as Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare.
pp. 30-31.

^^Howard P. Simpson, "The Guerrilla and His World,"
The United States Naval Institute Proceedings. August 1969,
pp. 42-53.

^^Chaliand places the average age of active combatants
in guerrilla bands in the 15-25 year age group. Guerrilla
Strategies, p. 16. Photographs and television coverage of
the current (1984) fighting in Lebanon bears this out.
While it is difficult to tell from blurred newspaper photo

graphs and glimpses on a television screen, the impression
one gains is that a sizeable number of the irregular combat
ants in Lebanon are not yet fifteen years old.

^^Simpson, "Guerrilla," p. 45.

See also Chaliand,

Guerrilla Strategies, p. 12-14; Francois Sully, Age of the
Guerrilla <New York: Avon Books, 1970), pp. 13-18; Douglas

Hyde, The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 131-48; and Paget,
Counter-Inaurgencv Campaigning, pp. 23-24.
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t.hat. -the aacrlflcea that he and hla comradea In arma make

are necessary.

Only a deep commitment to his cause will

give the guerrilla the courage, peraerverance, and determi
nation that he needs to carry out hia arduous routine, day

in, day out, day after weary day.

He must also have above

average intelligence in order to enable him to uae a wide
variety of the tools of his trade, to evaluate military sit
uations quickly and correctly, and to plan actions against
the enemy.

The guerrilla also requires physical stam-

ina^^ in order to be able to make the necessary marches and
maneuvers, fight the necessary actions, and possibly even
hold down a full time 30b as well as a cover for his clan
destine activities.

Some of the equipment of conventional armies is

lacking among guerrilla units, but this does not in any way
detract from their effectiveness.

The guerrilla has no

heavy steel helmet, no body armor, no combat boots, no bulky
pack.

Yet these shortages are not a source of weakness for

the guerrilla but rather a source of strength, for being
without all of this heavy equipment gives the guerrilla a

feeling of freeness or lightness that greatly contributes to
his free-wheeling mobility.

^^Simpson, "Guerrilla," p. 45.
^^lh±dm

See also Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, pp

15-23.

^^Simpson, "Guerrilla," p. 45.

^^Ibid.
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The Metamorphoae o£ a Guerrilla Force

As guerrrllla unlt.s grow in size, in nunber^ and in
power, t-heir tacbics become more and more the tactics of a
conventional army.

The units themselves also come more

and more to resemble highly mobile contingents of regular
forces.

This growth will pose a problem insofar as the

area of operation for the unit is concerned.

In those re

mote areas where the guerrilla unit would be most safe,
there also will generally be few targets of military impor
tance.

On the other hand, in areas where there are more

significant targets for the guerrilla force to attack, there
will also generally be greater exposure and greater danger
of the force being discovered.

The guerrilla leader must

consider and balance these two factors in deciding where his

group will operate most effectively.

®'^Hao Tse-Tung, "On Protracted War," pp. 244-5.

®®Simpson, "Guerrilla," p. 44.

CHAPTER IV

THEORIES OF COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE

Introduction

Several atraLegies have been tried in combatting guer
rilla warfare in thia century.

One of the moat common and

most popular but least successful techniques has been to
increase the size of the police force to the maximum extent

possible and then to establish these law enforcement officers
in strong points throughout the territory where insurgency

guerrilla warfare has begun.

This strategy almost always

fails, since the local police forces do not possess the
necessary training, equipment, or authority to deal effec

tively with the subersive activities confronting them.^
Left to conduct counter-insurgency warfare by themselves,

police forces are almost always overwhelmed by the magnitude

of the task they face.^
^Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning
(London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 31.

^Hany examples of this situation could be cited.
situation in Cuba in 1958 provides but one example.

The

Numerous

foreigners were kidnapped by the guerrillas, including the
then-famous automobile racing world champion driver, Senor

Juan Fangio.

All of the victims were well treated and

released unharmed. The guerrillas merely wished to demon
strate the total inability of the Batista government to
maintain law and order. See Douglas Hyde, The Roots of
Guerrilla Warfare (London: The Bodley Head, 1968), p. 36.
46
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Another unBuccessful counter-insurgency strategy has

been the attempt to wage a conventional war against guer

rilla forces.^

Were the insurgents willing to cooperate

with the counter-insurgency £orces and likewise wage conven

tional war, this strategy might have some worth.

However,

i£ we remember that the insurgents have adopted guerrilla

war£are because they cannot £ight a conventional war and

because they wish to overthrow the government in place, we
see that the chances o£ their cooperating with their enemies
in this way is quite small.
Conventional war£are is war£are o£ position.

tional £orces take and hold ground.

Conven

The guerrilla, on the

other hand, does not seek to hold ground (with the possible

exception o£ his ^sa£e' bases).

Instead he seeks to in£lict

injury on the £orcea opposing him and to render their con
trol o£ the territory tenuous or impossible.

This being the case, the tendency o£ guerrilla £orcea

is to disappear when large-scale conventional sweeps through
their territory are made.

A £ew moments' reflection will

reveal that this is not at all difficult for the guerrilla
to do.

First, it must be realized that it is virtually impos

sible to conceal the preparations for a conventional

^Some military historians feel that this is one mistake
made by the U. S. forces in Vietnam.

See Francois Sully,

Age of the Guerrilla (New York: Avon Books, 1968), pp.

168-72, and Paget, Counter-Insurgenev Camoaianino. p. 16.
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military operation o£ even modeat alze.

Moat auch operatlona

Involve a unit o£ at leaat battalion alze^ and It la pro-

£oundly dl££lcult £or over a thouaand men to prepare to do
anything In concert with one another without aomeone
noticing the preparatlona.

Second^ It muat be realized that conventional mili

tary actlona today advertlae their preaence.

Thua a aweep

through guerrllla-ln£eated territory may aachew a preceedlng
artillery bombardment In order to achieve aurprlae, but

aurprlae will be rarely achieved In £act.

The aound o£ an

approaching helicopter la dlatlnctlve and loud.
the aounda made by approaching armored vehlclea.

So alao are
The guer

rilla, well aware that hla £orcea have neither helicoptera

nor tanka, la In no doubt concerning what la happening.

Given thla adequate 1£ Inadvertent warning, the guerrilla

wrapa hla rl£le In plaatlc, burlea It, and then plcka up
hla hoe.

By the time the troopa arrive, he la apparently

merely another £armer hard at work earning an honeat living.
At the conclualon o£ the aweep, the guerrilla laya down hla

hoe, dlga up and unwrapa hla rl£le, and la back In the bualneaa o£ Inaurgency In leaa time than It takea to write about
It.

Hlatorlcally, ma3or conventional aweepa have been
£allurea lnao£ar aa harming guerrilla movementa la con

cerned.

What auch aweepa have accompllahed la to demon-

atrate to the local population that the government In
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piacQ la Incapable of controlling guerrilla activity.

More

over, government-populace relationa may deteriorate further
if the troopa employed in auch laborioua but fruitleaa maneuvera, fruatrated at finding no guerrillaa after weeka of
training and preparation aa well aa of action, vent their

anger and frustration in acta of indiacriminate violence
againat the inhabitants of a guerrilla-infested area under
the guiae of interrogation or of establishing law and
order•^
Julian Paget writes.

An insurgency force, wherever it ia fighting, cannot
survive for long without certain essentials, which are:
<a> The support of the local population.
(b) Bases.

(c> Mobility.

<d> Supplies and information.

<e> The will to win.^

Paget holds that the way to defeat an insurgency force
is to deprive them of one or more of the essentials that

they need for survival.^

In many oases, if only one of

these essentials is denied the insurgency force, they will

rapidly become unable to continue operations.

^For an example of an incident of this sort of gratui
tous violence, see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York* The

Viking Press, 1983>, p. 26.

Such incidents reveal a break

down in morale and training, but they also reveal a far more
important poverty in strategy.

^aget. Counter-Insurgencv Campaianina. p. 166.
^Ibid., p. 167-68.
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Denial o£ the Support o£ the Local Population

Mao Tae-'Tung apoke of Ihe local populat.ion aa t.he aea

in which t.he guerrilla awiaa.*^

If t^he population can be

turned againat the inaurgency movement thia will reduce the
guerrillas to the condition of fiah out of water.
There are aeveral waya in which thia alienation can be

achieved.

Perhapa the moat important aapect of thia facet

of counter-inaurgency warfare ia the removal of all legiti
mate complaints that the populace may have againat the gov
ernment in place.

In cases where the local government has

been corrupt or extraordinarily inefficient^ the first task
of the forces seeking to put down an inaurgency force must

be to establish fair and ^ust government.^
^Mao Tae-Tung, "Guerrilla Warfare," in T. N. Greene,
The Guerrilla—and How to Fioht Him (New York: Frederick A.

Praeger, 1962>, pp. G-7.

^Sully describee Ramon Nagsaysay as using this tech
nique aa one of his first moves againat the Huk guerrillas
in the Philippines in 1950, Aoe of the Guerrilla, p. 99. On
the other hand, one of the difficulties faced by those
nations seeking to support South Vietnam in its struggle
againat the Vietcong and the conventional forces of North
Vietnam waa the fact that the various governments that came

to power in South Vietnam from 1950 onward were corrupt to
one degree or another. It waa often the case that large
segments of the population—sometimes even a majority--had
legitimate complaints against the government in power.
Under such conditions it was difficult or impossible to

isolate the general populace from the insurgents and to

prevent significant portions of the populace from providing
aid to then, even if it was only the passive assistance of
not reporting the guerrillas to the government authorities.
See Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York: The Viking Press,
1983), pp. 35, 253, 257, and 277. Paget ascribes the
British promise of independence to Malaya as the removal of
a source of alienation between the people of Malaya and
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However, the establlahment of good government by it

self may not alienate the populace from the guerrilla move
ment.

To understand the relationship that exists between

a populace and the guerrillas operating within their num
bers, we must take a closer look at the composition of the

populace in regard to their sympathies for or against the
insurgency movement.

Paget points out that the population in any country
involved in insurgency warfare normally consists of people
in each of four different categories.

First, there are

those who lend their active and willing support to the in

surgency even though they are not actively involved in the

guerrilla war.

Second, there are those who actively and

willingly support the government in place.
However, the most important factions in the popula
tion for the consideration of the counter-insurgency leader,

according to Paget, are the third and the fourth groups he
delineates.

The third group are those people who provide

support to the guerrillas when it is demanded out of fear
of what may happen if they do not cooperate.

The fourth

group are those who escape intimidation but who, nonethe
less, refuse to throw their active support either way,

choosing instead to wait and see who wins and then to

their colonial government that undercut the guerrillas
promise of independence. See Counter-Insuraencv Campaigning,
p. 64.
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support the winner.^ (It is well to remeiRber, at this point,
that support of the losing side in a war of insurgency is
almost invariably fraught with negative consequences and is

quite often fatal.

That being the case, it is easier to

extend a charitable understanding toward those who wish to

avoid aiding with either contestant until there are clear
indications concerning who will ultimately win.)

In regard to the first group, those who actively sup
port the insurgency, action must be taken to identify these
supporters and then to treat them in the same manner as
those engaged in waging guerrilla warfare against the re
gime.

To accomplish this, the government may have to pass

new laws and will almost undoubtedly need to augment its

police forces and provide them with special training.
In regard to the second group, those who actively

support the government, the government must take every step
to ensure their safety and freedom from coercion.

Again,

this task may necessitate the passing of special laws, espe

cially laws pertaining to such things as curfews, the issu
ance and carrying of appropriate identification, and the
restriction of normal movement within the country.

Too,

here again we see the need for more skilled police work and
thus the need for more skilled policemen.

The third group presents certain problems, since their

^Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, p. 168.
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aituation will usually remain unameliora'ted by police action

alone; action by the other civil authorities as well as by
the military will probably be required to deal with this
portion of the population.

The third group, those who assist the guerrillas from
fear, need simultaneously to be protected from guerrilla
attacks and to be encouraged to do their duties as citizens

of the government in power.

It is simply unreasonable to

expect a father whose daughter is a hostage of a guerrilla
band to freely provide information concerning the size,
location, and future plans of that band.

That being the

case, the government must often start its campaign to deny
the guerrillas the support of the populace by military ac
tions against the guerrillas aimed at breaking their con
stant access to the local population.

If the military is

capable of imposing a physical barrier between the guer
rillas and the population, this will greatly support the
task of winning back the disaffected.

However, it may also be necessary to take punitive

action against the population in order to bring them into
line.

Such punitive steps as the imposition of a twenty-two

hour a day curfew or collective fines for those communities

shown to be supporting the insurgents may be indicated both

as punishments and as actions confirming the belief that the
government is still in control.

However, since such steps

tend to punish the innocent along with the guilty they
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ehould be used wibh the finest discretion.

While a knowledge of those measures that have been

applied with success elsewhere is helpful to the person con
ducting counter-insurgency warfare, it will not do simply

to apply in one situation a procedure that had worked well
in another.

Resettling a large portion of the population in

newly constructed and well protected villages was one of the
keys to the success in the fight against insurgents in
Malaya; an attempt to carry out a similar programme in
Vietnam was a virtually unmitigated disaster.

In Malaya,

those who were resettled were landless Chinese immigrants

who had been eking out an existence farming at the edge of
the 3ungle on plots "borrowed** from large plantations.

The

resettlement was carried out by an impeccably trained civil

service and gave these immigrants the first real homes they
had ever enjoyed since they were given title to their home

and adjacent farmland over a period of time.

In Vietnam,

the peasants who were relocated were almost all landowners.
The relocation was carried out by troops and government

officials who were often corrupt and dishonest, stealing the

possessions of those being relocated and demanding bribes
before they would carry out their duty of moving the peas-

ante
'poeoeeions.^^
lOjbid., p. 169.
Hlbid., p. 59-60; Karnow, Vietnam, pp. 231-2,
255-58
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Moat, counter-insurgency commanders enter the fight
with limited resources.

One action that has helped alle

viate this shortage and has also provided enhanced security
for the populace has been the formation of militia home
guard units.

These units are drawn from the population^

trained^ and armed to provide security and protection for
their own homes.

Such units release military forces from

static defensive duties and allow them to go over to the

offensive against the guerrilla.

Denial of Bases

The denial to the guerrilla forces of safe bases is

often moat difficult or even impossible, but where it can be

accomplished it may well be the quickest method to destroy a

guerrilla force.

The guerrilla force that has no relatively

safe location for training, storage of supplies, rest,
treatment of casualties, and reorganization is the guerrilla
force that is in serious danger.
As mentioned before, wide-scale conventional military

sweeps through the area where the guerrillas are suspected
of having their base are seldom effective.

While supplies

and installations that are not readily portable may be dis

covered and destroyed, the guerrilla is usually able to hide
and thereby save anything that is of importance to the move
ment.

pp. 66-67.
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One militery tactile that has been found to be highly
effective agalnat the guerrlllaa'' baae areas la preclaely

the sort of penetration and assault tactic used by the guer
rilla himself.

Regular forces who have been thoroughly and

carefully trained In guerrilla tactics enter guerrillaInfested areas and wage guerrilla warfare against the guer
rillas.

Such tactics have been devastatlngly success

ful In destroying guerrilla baae areas when teamed with air
and sea units.

Using radio communlcations^ such units can

call down bombs, rockets, artillery, and naval gunfire

accurately on the base camp.

The first notice that the

guerrilla has that his base Is no longer hidden Is the ex
plosion of the Incoming ordnance In his midst.
Even where aggressive guerrllla-type patrolling by

the security forces falls to discover a base area. It can
still be effective In denying a base to the guerrillas.

As

what had been a safe area for the guerrilla gradually be

comes an area frequented by guerrllla-type patrols of the

government security forces. It Is only logical for the guer
rilla to withdraw from this area.

will be required to move his base.

In so withdrawing, he

Each such move denies

^^Surprisingly, such units In Vietnam sustained pro
portionately lower casualty rates than regular forces em
ployed In conventional warfare against the guerrilla forces
there. See Francis J. West, Jr., "Stingray '70", The United
States Naval Institute Proceedings. November 1969, pp. 27-27

l^ibid.
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him a baae area temporarily^ and each new baae will be more
removed from the guerrilla'a propoaed area of operationa.

Denial of Mobility

Thoae tactica that hinder the guerrilla in hia attempts
to maintain a aafe baae area, namely the diapatching againat

him of small groups of soldiers trained in guerrilla tac
tics, will also tend to seriously disrupt hia mobility.
Ambushes by these forces will tend to make the guerrilla
forces more cautious in their movements.

Other tactica will also aaaiat the military in denying

mobility to insurgency forces.

The availability of a large

tactical reserve force will allow a commander to throw over

whelming force againat a guerrilla unit once contact is
made, thereby maintaining contact, denying escape, and de
stroying the guerrilla force.
Where terrain is favorable helicopters may be used

to advantage to transport reserves to the area where contact
with the guerrilla has been established.

In addition, where

the countryside is open and without vegetation that would

supply cover to personnel attempting to cross it, the heli

copter may be used to detect and cut off the movement of the
guerrilla forces.

ISpaget, Counter-Insurgent Campaigning, p. 172.
l^Ibid.
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Denial o£ Suopllea and Information

The aame meaaurea that deny the guerrlllaa acceaa to

the local population in order to intimidate and coerce it
into co-operation will, of courae, prevent the guerrilla
from receiving auppliea from that population.

Moreover,

those tactics that will disrupt the guerrilla's freedom of

movement will alao disrupt his aupply routes.
Under normal circumatancea, it is extremely difficult

to prevent the insurgency forces from obtaining rather de
tailed information concerning the strength, preparedness,
and intentions of the security forces since one of the prep

arations that insurgents will make before beginning guer
rilla warfare is the establishment of a network of spies and

informers.

The counter-insurgency forces can nullify this

advantage by cordoning off the insurgents, thereby pre

venting their sources from providing them with information.
The well developed intelligence system of the insurgents
also dictates the need for far tighter security than is

normally practiced at a military installation as well as the
careful

and intentional spreading of false information.

The counter-insurgency force that deprives their adversary

of rapid and accurate information has secured a ma3or advan
tage.

l^ibid., pp. 172-73.
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Denial o£ the Will to Win

In guerrilla warfare, far more t.han in convent.ional
warfare, the morale of the individual aoldier ia important.
Mao Tae-Tung underlinea thia when he urgea that the guer
rilla be conatantly encouraged by atreama of propaganda

from hia officers and political teachers.^®
If a continuoua atream of encouragement aervea to

build up the morale of the guerrilla, a barrage of negative
information can have the opposite effect.

Spreading false

reports of guerrilla losses will gain nothing; in fact, it

may backfire when the guerrilla learns that his aide has not
suffered as the government has indicated.

On the other

hand, every effort should be made to see to it that every

guerrilla ia promptly and fully informed concerning each
loss the insurgent forces suffered.

The spreading of this

information by government troops has been accomplished by
using planes equipped with loudspeakers flying over sus

pected guerrilla hideouts, by means of pamphlets, and by
means of sending guerrillas who have been captured back to
their forces to provide firsthand reports of defeats to
their comradea.

l®Mao Tse-Tung, letter to Comrade Lin Piao quoted from
Renmin Ribao editorial, 1 August 1966, "The Whole Country
Should Become a Great School of Mao Tae-Tung's Thought" in
Chairman Mao Tse-Tuna on People^a War (Peking: Foreign Lan

guage Press, 1967>, pp. 33-35.

^^Don B. Wyckoff, "Bloodless Weapon," The United
States Naval Institute Proceedings. September 1969, pp. 64-69
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I£ tihia paychological warfare la combined wit.h akilled,
energebic, and peraiat-ent. guerrilla acbiona by well trained
aoldiera againat the guerrillaa upon ground they conaider
theira, the individual guerrilla will find himaelf in a very

diacouraging aituation.

He will be afraid to go home at

night to viait hia wife becauae aome of hia comradea have
been ambuahed on auch tripa.

Aa food auppliea dwindle be

cauae of the guerrillaa' inability to contact outaidera and
receive auppliea from them^ hia hunger will become a conatant demoralizing companion.

If he cannot mount operationa

againat government forcea becauae they hold the initiative

and patrol hia area ao atrictly that he haa become the
hunted inatead of the hunter, hia will to continue the

fight will be further eroded.

Combine all of thia with the

newa that the government in place haa made conceaaiona and
granted privilegea to a degree that nothing further ia to
be gained by continued fighting, and the average guerrilla,

no matter how highly motivated he might have been when he
took up arma, will find it profoundly difficult to continue

the struggle.20
Paychological warfare techniques by themaelvea cannot

defeat an insurgent force.

However, coupled with sound

military tactics and appropriate civil and police action,

paychological warfare can be a powerful weapon againat an
insurgency force.

20paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp. 173-74.
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Co-oDerat.ion and

Co-ordlnat.ion

A at.udy of t,he various -techniques to be employed to
successfully defeat an insurgency movement reveals that
action must be take by several different branches of the
government.

In particular, it should be emphasized that

counter'insurgency warfare is not merely military action
against guerrillas.

In fighting a counter-insurgency action

it is very possible to win virtually all of the battles ex
cept the last one if the leader of the counter-insurgency

force seeks a purely military victory over his opponent.
The military action of the government must be co
ordinated with suitable actions taken by the legislature,

the police, the courts, various license-issuing bureaus and
officials, and the militia.

The campaign against the guer

rilla must be waged not only in the field but also in the
minds of the populace.

In the final analysis, the govern

ment in place can overcome an insurgency force easily and

efficiently only if the people it governs wish it to over
come that force.

CHAPTER

V

THE BIBLICAL IDEA OF CIVIL GOVERNHENT

In-troduc-bion

We have now examined Lhe phenomenon of warfare and

eapecially that of twentieth century counter-insurgency war
fare.

Throughout the history of mankind, we find attempts

made to limit or ameliorate the harshness of war.

The 3ust

war teaching of the theologians of classical Lutheran or
thodoxy is one of these attempts.

Any attempt to explain the concept of the 3ust war

held by the seventeenth century theologians, made without
taking into consideration the biblical idea of what civil
government should be, is certain to fail.

It is certain to

fail because the theologians of the period of Lutheran

orthodoxy considered themselves to be, above all esle, bib

lical theologians.^

While they could and did differ

^"Orthodoxy is more than a mere attitude or spirit.
The concrete feature of Lutheran orthodoxy is its doctrinal,

platform, a definite and permanent doctrinal position baaed
on Scripture. . . ." writes Robert Prues, The Theoloav of
Post-Reformation Lutheraniam

<St. Louis: Concordia Publishing

House, 1970>, p. 30. Hagglund writes, "The method Cemployed
by the orthodox Lutheran theologiansi was quite different
from the one used by dogmaticians today. It was not felt
that theology had to be presented in a uniform way, by

placing an emphasis on certain basic ideas.

On the con

trary, the dogmaticians of the 17th century believed that it
was their task to reproduce the infinite richness of Bib
lical revelation." Bengt Hagglund, Historv of Theoloqv
62
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concerning how best to arrange and present what they taught,
the orthodox Lutheran theologians agreed,
. . . we receive and embrace with our

whole heart the

Prophetic and Apostolic Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments as the pure, clear fountain of Israel, which
is the only true standard by which all teachers and doc

trines are to be judged.2

The Preservation of God and Civil Government

The biblical teaching concerning civil government can

not be understood apart from an understanding of the tempor

ality of this world.

The biblical idea of civil government

should be examined in the light of God's activity to keep
this world in existence.

The Bible describes God not only as the creator of the
cosmos but also as the Being who is continually active to

preserve that cosmos in existence.

Of Jesus Christ, God the

Son, Paul wrote.

He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn
over all creation.

For by Him all things were created:

things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible,
whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all

<St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 196d>, p. 303. Both
Preus and Hagglund provide a much needed antidote to the

popular misconception that the theology of the era of
Lutheran orthodoxy was a recrudesence of some of the worst
features of scholastic Aristotelianisro.

While the works of

that era, like the works of any other, vary in quality, the
fact remains that many of the orthodox Lutheran theologians
produced works of great abiding merit.

^Formula of Concord. Thorough Declaration, Summary,
para. 3.
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t.hings were created by Him and £or Him.

He la before

all bhlnga, and In Him all trhinge hold "bogebher-^
The God of bhe Bible is nob bhe "wabchmaker" God of
bhe deiaba who creabed all bhab bhere ia^ aeb lb in mobion

in accordance wibh hia magnificenb lawa^ and bhen walked

away bo leb ib run oub iba courae according bo bhoae immubable lawa.

He ia rather a God who preaervea the coamoa He

haa created.

Human reaaon can graap, if only dimly, that God pre

serves His creation.^

However, bhab bhe believer may be

bhe more cerbain of bhia loving care of hia God, bhe Scripburea beach bhia truth time and time again.

The Lord Jeaus beachea in Habhew'a gospel.
Therefore I bell you, do not worry about your life,
what you will eat or drink; or about your body, what you
will wear. Ia not life more important than food, and
bhe body more imporbanb than clothes? Look at bhe birds
of the air; they do not sow or reap or atore away in
barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you
not much more valuable than they?
Who of you by wor
rying can add a aingle hour to hia life?
And why do you worry about clothes? See how the
lilies of the field grow. They do not labor or spin.
Yet I tell you that not even Solomon in all hia splendor
was dreaaed like one of these.

If that ia how God

clothes the grass of the field, which ia here today and
tomorrow ia thrown into bhe fire, will He not much more

clothe you, O you of little faith?

^Colossians 1:15-17.

So do not worry.

<A11 biblical quotations are

taken from The Holv Bible. New International Version

CGrand Rapids: Zondervan Bible Publiahera, 1976], copyright
1978 by bhe New York International Bible Society.)

^Acbs 14:17.

Ib is perhaps worthy of note bhab bhe

fact bhab men can grasp by bhe power of reaaon that God ia a
God who preaervea His creation does not mean that men d^ in
fact graap bhia knowledge.
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saying^ ^What. ahalX we eat.?' or ^What ahall we drink?'
or ""What ahall we wear?'

For the pagana run after all

theae thlnga, and your heavenly Father knowa that you
need them.^
Theae worda of the Lord remind ua that God preaervea

not only the entire coamoa but alao each entity within It
Individually.

Thua, the Bible aaaurea ua that the moat In-

significant of Items Is sustained by God.^
God preaervea the coamoa ualng proceaaea and actlvltlea within that coamoa.

However, the operation of the

meana that God uaea In preserving creation ahould not be
considered aa coordinate with the activity of God but rather

subordinate to It."^

God created a good cosmos,^ but that good cosmos was
soon good no more.

Instead It was atalned by the aln of

God'a foremost creature, man.

Now there la no part of the

creation that Is free from the taint of sln.^
The continued presence of evil In the creation ralaea

the question of whether and In what measure God concurs In
that which la evil.

Scripture la not silent In thla regard.

God, who is good,^^ abhors and prohibits that which is
^Matthew 6:25-32.
^Hatthew 10:29-31.

7p8alm 127:1, Acts 17:28, Matthew 5:45.
Genesis 1:31.

^salm 14:1-3; Eccleslastes 7:20; Romans 8:18-21.
3-OMatthew 19:17, Psalm 145:9, etc.
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evil.^1

Yet evil actions occur.

Froa the testiaony of

the Bible we aay say that God concurs in these evil actions
insofar as they are actions#

but does not concur in the

evil of thea.^3
This cosaos which God created good and man rendered
evil will not last forever.

It is consigned to destruc

tion.^^ and the date of that cataclisa has already been

set once and for all by God.^^

On that day# God Himself

will destroy this cosmos that He created.

Until that

final day# God preserves this cosmos for the sake of be

lievers.^'''
One of the means that God uses to preserve His chil
dren In the world from harm is the civil government.

Paul

wrote of this fact when he urged that prayers be offered for
civil authorities so that "we may live peaceful and quiet
lives in all godliness and holiness.

^^Exodus 20:1-17# Deuteronomy 5:6-22# Deuteronomy 32:4#
Psalm 92:15# Galatians 3:10# Deuteronomy 27:26.

^^Acts 17:26.

13p©<ilm 5:4-6# James 1:13.

1^2 Peter 3:7.

ISMatthew 24:36# Mark 13:32.

l^Psalm 102:25-26# Hebrews l:lO-12.

^'^Hatthew 24:14# Romans 6:28.

Idj Timothy 2:2.

Thus# to write that God being a God

not of confusion and disorder but rather of peace has or
dained civil government to promote peace and order falls a
bit wide of the point. See P. F. Siegel# "Civil Government"#
pp. 508-521 in Theodore Laetsch# ed.# The Abiding Word 3
vols. (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House# 1958)# vol.
1# especially p. 50d.
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Civil Governiftent. Eat.abXiahed bv God

The Bible -teaches that God eatabliahea civil govern-

nent.

Moreover^ the Bible goea beyond teaching that God haa

ordained the idea of civil government to claim that God him
self eatabliahea particular governments.

Paul, writing to the Christiana in Rone, spoke to both
theae points in a passage that haa been cited often by those
seeking to show the divine eatabliahment of civil govern
ment.

Paul wrote.

Everyone must submit himself to the governing author
ities, for there is no authority except that which God
has established.

The authorities that exist have been

established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against
the authority is rebelling against what God haa insti
tuted, and those who do so will bring judgment on them

selves.^^
It is well to note that Paul did not speak concerning

the form of government.

He said simply that the government

in being, whether it be monarchy, republic, oligarchy, or
whatever, is established by God.

Thus, to see this verse as

advocating one form of government in preference to another
is to misinterpret it.
Paul said, further, that to rebel against the author

ity is to bring down judgment upon oneself.

What he wrote

here merely underlines Christ's own prohibition issued to

Peter when Peter sought to resist the civil authorities by
means of force in the Garden of Getheemane.

l^omans 13:1-2.

^OMatthew 26:52.
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Paul noted that the powers that be are ordained by

God.

By this he meant that not only la the general Idea of

civil government established by God^ It Is God who appoints
the rulers who rule.

This teaching la supported by Christ's

own words to Pontius Pllate^^ as well as by the words of the
Old Testament.22

The Duties of Civil Government

The Bible assigns specific tasks and duties to the

civil government.

In reviewing what these tasks are^ It la

best to begin by delimiting them and stating those powers
that the civil government does not have.

First, the civil government cannot legitimately compel

disobedience to the Law of God.23

Second, the civil govern

ment cannot legitimately Interfere with those matters that

are the duty of the Church.

To be more specific, the civil

government may not legitimately legislate concerning the

preaching of the Gospel and the celebration of the sacra
ments.

Defined another way, the civil government Is to deal

with temporal matters while the Church concerns herself with

eternal matters.24

This, then. Is the correct under

standing of the words of Jesus when He commands us to "Give

21John 19:11.

22£xodus 3:10, 1 Samuel 9:16, 1 Kings 19:15, Daniel
2:21, etc.

23Acts 5:29.

24john 18:36.
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'to Caeeor what la Caeear'e# and to God what is God's***^^
Paul, urging that prayers be offered for those in
authority, cited the duties given by God to civil govern
ment.

Civil government is so to conduct its business that

the Church **may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godli

ness and holiness."26

it is the duty of the civil govern

ment so to rule that peace, tranquility, and good order are

experienced within its jurisdiction.

In the performance of

these duties, the government is permitted to levy such taxes
as may be necessary to provide the funds to pay its ex

penses.27

This obligation to preserve peace and order

includes the duty to protect its jurisdiction from the
encroachment of foreign invaders.

Moreover, in the defense

of this peace and order, the civil government is authorized

to use force, even deadly force.26
25Matthew 22:21.

26i Timothy 2:2

27Romans 13:6-7.

28Ronans 13:4.

CHAPTER

VI

HEDIEVAL ANTECEDENTS FOR LUTHER'S THINKING
CONCERNING THE TWO KINGDOMS OF GOD

Int,roduction

Martin Luther'e thinking concerning the two kingdoma

God, the kingdom of Hia left and of Hia right hand, la drawn
from the biblical teaching concerning civil government.
However, Luther'a teaching waa not developed in a vacuum.

It did not apring, full grown, from hia mind aa Minerva came
from the head of Zeua.

Inatead, it ia the reault of aober

reflection upon the Word, reflection undertaken in the face
of then preaent challengea and in the light of hiatorical
precedenta.

Two of thoae precedenta require at leaat a brief de-

acription, for they wielded a profound influence upon
Luther'a predeceaaora and many of hia contemporariea.

Theae

two precedenta are the idea of the two citiea developed by
Auguatine and the idea of the two aworda made moat explicit

by Peter Damian and Pope Boniface VIII.^

If we cannot give

either of theae theoriea a careful explication in the light
of each one'a hiatorical context, atill a aketch of each

poaition will provide a uaeful background againat which to

^Compare the evaluation of Karl Hertz, Two Kingdoms
and One World (Minneapolla:

Augaburg Publiahing Houae,

1976), p. 18.
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view Luther'a poaltion concerning the relation of the two
kingdoma.

Auauatine!

Two Citiea

In A.D. 395^ Auguatine waa conaecrated biahop of Hippo
in North Africa.
November 430.

He held this poat until hia death in

In addition to hia dutiea aa paator of the

cathedral in Hippo and administrative overseer of the other
parishes in the diocese, Augustine waa expected to spend a
number of houra each day presiding aa a oudge in civil suits.

He also supervised a monastery as well as a convent.^

Thus,

in hia mature years, Auguatine waa a biahop of the church,

primarily concerned with the care of the aoula in hia dio
cese.

That being the case, we may aay two things concerning

hia writings of this period.

First these writings are not

the result of the musings of a detached theoretician com

fortably ensconced in a carefully insulated ivory tower;
rather, these are the writings of a man who daily met,
worked with, advised, preached to, loved, prayed for, and
served all sorts and conditions of men.

Second, these

writings are not the result of what Augustine considered to
be hia primary task; their authorship was considered ancil

lary or, at best, supplemental, to Augustine's pastoral
dutiea.

2petor Brown, Auauatine of Hippo (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1969>, pp. 189-202.
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Paul Tlllich ascrlbea August.lne'a pe8ainiat.ic view

of aan, at. leaat. In part, to hla aaaocla-tion wlt.h Mani-

chaeiam.^
aona.

However, thia eeema doub-tful for two rea-

Flrat, one flnda none of the duallam in Auguatine

that ia ao eaaential to Manlchaelaa.

Second, one flnda

ample aupport for Auguatine'a peaaimiam in the Scripturea.
Certainly there ia no denying that Auguatine'a view
of man ia peaaimiatic.

However, in order to underatand

Auguatine'a viewa and the rationale for hia peaaimiam, one

needa a graap of Auguatine'a ideaa concerning the hiatory of

mankind and eapecially of hia ideaa concerning man'a fall
into ain.

Not all that Auguatine writea concerning man ia tinged

with peaaimiam.

To the contrary, when Auguatine writea of

the firat people, Adam and Eve, he apeaka of their initial

condition in glowing terma.

They were without ain, and, had

they remained ainleas, would have been immortal.'^

Moreover,

had they never ainned, they would have experienced neither

illneaa nor the weakneaa that cornea with old age.^
Prior to the fall, people poaaeaaed true freedom, in
the aenae that they were able to refrain from ainning <Doaae)

3paul Tlllich, A Historv of Chriatian Thought (New
York: Harper and Row, Publiahera, 196S>, pp. 106-7; aee alao
pp. 122-31.

^Auguatine, The Citv of God, bk. 13, chap. 19.
^The Citv of God, bk. 13, chap. 20.
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non pecqre).^

In addition# God created Adam and Eve with

wiXie that were good,^ that ie they were inclined to carry
out the will of God by meana of a apecial gift of God'a

grace aa well aa a apecial gift of peraerverence.

Theae

gl£ta did not compel Adam and Eve to chooae that which ia

good# but it did aeeiat them in their chooeing the good.^
Thua their bodiea were entirely aubject to their willa# and

their wille to God's will.^

Had Adam and Eve not fallen

into ain but rather had continued to do the will of God# at

length they would have been confirmed in their bliaa and
would have received what Auguatine considered to be the

greatest liberty# the inability to ain (non poaae peccare).

However# the fact ia that the first persona on this
earth fell into ain.

In discussing this event# Auguatine

makes it painfully clear that he considers the fault for the
fall of man into ain to lie entirely with man.

Specifi

cally# any blame for the original choice of evil instead of

^Augustine# On Rebuke and Grace, chap. 33.
"^The Citv of God, bk. 14# chap. 11.
®Ibid.

See also On Rebuke and Grace, chaps. 32 and

34# aa well aa The Citv of God, bk. 14# chap. 17.

^Augustine# On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins
and On the Baotiam of Infanta, bk. 2# chap. 36.

^QOn Rebuke and Grace, chap. 33.

See also J. N. D.

Kelly# Earlv Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper and Row#
Publishers# 1960># pp. 361-66.
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good mu6t lie with the will of the first
man waa free and Inclined toward goodness.

The will of
Nevertheless^ it

had the possibility of choosing wrongfully, and this is in
fact what it did.

In his desire to rebel against his natural master,

God, and to be thereby his own master, we find the impetus

and the essential character of man's first sin.^^

Pride

lies at the root of the first (and of all subsequent) sin.^^
The idea that sin originates in man's prideful substi

tution of himself in place of God as his master is closely
related to Augustine's concept of evil being the privation

of good.

By choosing himself as his own master, man chooses

less than the best, since to have God, the totally good, for

one's master is better than to have one's fallible self.^^
Augustine held that all people partake of the fall in
virtue of their participation in and co-responsibility for

Adam's wrongful choice

Augustine wrote, "By the evil

^^Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 2,
chap. 48.

^^Kelly, Doctrines, pp. 361-62; Augustine, The
Citv of God, bk. 14, chap. 13.

^^The City of God, bk. 14, chaps. 13-14.
I'iln this, Augustine shows far greater reliance on
Plotinus than many are willing to admit. For a clear discus
sion of what Plotinus'a theory of evil was and what it was

not, see D. O'Brien, "Plotinus on Evil," Downside Review 87
(1969):68-110.

^®Kolly, Doctrines, pp. 303-04.
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will of that, one man all alnned in him, alnce all were that

one man, from whom, therefore, they Individually derived

original sin."^^

Elsewhere, he wrote,

. . all then sinned

in Adam, when in hia nature, by virtue of that innate power

whereby he waa able to produce them, they were all aa yet
the one Adam. . .

Augustine distinguished between the

guilt of original sin and the evil effects of that ain, but
he contended that all humanity (with the sole exception of
Christ) muat bear both the guilt and the evil effects of the

fall.

It is the guilt of the fall that the sacrament of

baptism is instituted to remove.^®
Augustine's concept of the evil effects of the fall
covers a vast range of human ills and foibles.

The most

serious of these effects is that man has now been rendered

incapable of refraining from sinning (non poaae non peccare).

Thus, all men are evil and may appropriatly be

considered a massa oerdita.^Q

It is the vigour with which

Augustine put forward the universal condemnation of all man
kind that marks the advance of his theology beyond that of

^®0n Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 2, chap. 15.
^"^On the Merits and the Forgiveness of Sins and On
the Baptism of Infants, bk. 3, chap. 14.

^®Ibid., Against Julian- bk. 6, chap. 14.

^®Augustine, Concerning Man's Perfection in Right
eousness. bk. 4, chap. 9.

2®Augustino, Enchiridion. 27.
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Ambroae^ hi© teacher-21

Augustine went so far a© to contend

that the virtues displayed by the heathen are "vile, de

formed, and abominable,"22 for where there is no true re

ligion there can be no true virtue-23
The fact that man cannot refrain from sinning does

not, however, destroy man's capacity for free choice (liberurn
arbitrium)-

Augustine wrote.

We do not say that by the sin of Adam free will perished
out of the nature of men; but that it avails for sinning

in men subjected to the devil; while it is not of avail
for good and pious living, unless the will itself of man
should be made free by God's grace, and assisted to

©very good movement of action, of speech, of thought-24
Augustine was thoroughly convinced that all men were
evil and that no man could perform any virtuous act without

the supernatural aid of God's grace.

Moreover, only those

predestined by God receive that grace necessary to perform
truly virtuous works and to be saved-

Those predestined to

salvation, however, are but a minority of the people in the

world-25

All of the rest of mankind i© condemned, a© aleo

the elect would be, had God not predestined them to

2lReinhold Seeburg, Text-book of the History of Doc
trines. trans- Charles E- Hay (Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1966>, pp. 1, 343-

22The City of God- bk. 5, chap- 2023ibid-, bk- 19, chap- 25-

24Augu©tine, Against Two Letter© of the Paleaiansbk. 2, chap- 9-

25Enchiridion- 97-

77

BQlvatrion.26
Auguat-ine made a aharp diat.lnc'tlon bet.ween t.he elect
and the reprobate.
God.

The former are cltizena of the City of

The latter are cltizena of the City of the World.

He

wrote,

. . . the deaerved penalty of aln would have hurled all
headlong even Into the aecond death, of which there la
no end, had not the undeaerved grace of God aaved aome
therefrom.
And thua It haa come to paaa, that though
there are very many and great natlona all over the
earth, whoae rltea and cuatoma, apeech, arma, and dreaa,
are dlatlngulahed, by marked dlfferencea, yet there are
no more than two klnda of human aoclety, which we may

juatly call two cltlea, according to the language of our
Scrlpturea. The one conalata of thoae who wlah to live
after the fleah, the other of thoae who wlah to live

after the spirit.27
Auguatlne held that of thoae tralta that are common to
all men, aaved and reprobate alike, one la the dealre for

peace.

He wrote, "Who will not confess this with me, who

marks man^a affalra and the general form of nature?

For 3oy

and peace are desired alike by all men."26
Auguatlne went on to show that this dealre for peace
la universal by citing examples.

that peace may follow.

The warrior wages war so

Victory la nothing else than the

suppression of thoae who have resisted, and when victory la
achieved peace surely follows.

Even thoae who disturb the

peace of the community In which they live do so not In order

26The Cltv of God, bk. 15, chap. 1.

27ibld., bk. 14, chap. 1.
26ibld., bk. 19, chap. 12.
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•to deatroy the peace but laerely to alter it.

The aolitary

rogue will seek a peaceful modus Vivendi with those whom
he cannot kill, and in his own home he will seek to live in

peace with his wife and family.

Even the barbarous and

mythical Cacua, the monstrous son of Vulcan, who lived by
robbery and slaughter, must desire peace when he retires to

his cave after one of his forays of murder and stealing.29
Thus the need for peace is not only a universal character
istic of all men; it is that "all-embracing common denom
inator of human needs that seek realization in social

life."30
Those predestined to salvation who have received grace
and, thereby, faith understand that "The peace of mortal man
with immortal God is an orderly obedience unto His eternal

law performed in faith."31
However, so long as they are in this world, the elect

also partake of and support, insofar as they are able to do

so in good conscience, the peace of this world.32

Moreover,

the elect understand that even this earthly peace, which

consists in an orderly concord and obedience among its

29ibid., bk. 19, chap. 12.
30p©t.er Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of
Saint Augustine (London: Faber and Faber, 1972>, p. 40.

3lThe City of God, bk. 19, chap. 14.
32ibici., bk. 19, chap. 17.
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citizen©^^ is a gift, of their merciful God.^^

Thus it

comes as no surprise to the elect that they can contribute
to this earthly peace by living in orderly obedience under
God's law.

Augustine rejected Cicero's definition of a republic
as an estate of the people,

arguing that a people such as

Cicero describes has never existed.

Cicero had described a

people as "a multitude united in one consent of law and pro
fit.

However, the concept of a consent of law must

include the concept of justice, for where there is no jus

tice there is nothing that may rightly be called law.^®

But

there can be no justice where God does not receive the wor

ship that is due Him and Him alone, and God receives that

worship only in the City of God that is not of this world.^^
Augustine did not reject the idea of an earthly state;

he rejected merely Cicero's definition of such a state.

Augustine proceeded to give his own definition of a people.
A people is a multitude of reasonable creatures con
joined in a general agreement of those things it re
spects.

^^Ibid., bk. 19, chap. 13.

^^Ibid.

35lbid., bk. 19, chap. 14.
36lbid., bk. 19, chap. 21.
37ibid.

36lbid.

39lbid., bk. 2, chap. 21; bk. 19, chap. 23.
'^Oibid., bk. 19, chap. 24.
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This definlt,ion of a people corrects the defect found In
Cicero''a definition ^ for it substitutes the idea of **agree-

ment regarding those things respected" for the idea of "con
sent regarding law" that necessarily includes the concept

of justice.

With this correction^ one then possesses a

definition of the state that can be applied not only to

Rose, the state then under discussion, but also to the
Athenians, the Greeks in general, the Egyptians, and the

Babylonians.'^^

Thus Augustine intended that this definition

be applicable to the earthly civil state in general.
Since most of the people in the world are reprobate
rather than elect it must often be the case that in a given

state the reprobate outnumber the elect, and it is always
the case that the reprobate outnumber the elect among the
people of this world.

Since there can be no virtue where

there is no true religion'^^ states are often established
in order to achieve peace and other earthly gains such as
the happiness that comes from possession of material goods.
These states are devoid of 3ustice, for 3ustice is found in

'^Ijohn Neville Figgis, The Political Aspects of St.
Augustine^a ^Citv of God^ (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith,

1963>, pp. 60-61.

'^^The City of God, bk. 19, chap. 24.
43ibid., bk. 19, chap. 25.

'^'^Dino Bigongiari, "The Political Ideas of St. Augus
tine," in The Political Writings of St. Augustine, ed. Henry
Paolucci (South Bend, IN: Regnery/Gateway), pp. 348-49.
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-the City of God alone.

Thus Augustine characterlzea them aa

nothing other than bands of robbers operating on a grand
scale.

The elect live among these robbers in that robber
band that the robbers call a state.

Even though the repro

bate are the enemies of God, the elect still cooperate with

them in their earthly government in order to live in that

earthly peace that is but a pale image of the real thing.
Living among the reprobate as pilgrims or wayfarers, the
elect even pray for the temporal welfare and blessedness of
the reprobate even as the children of Israel prayed for
their Babylonian captors, for the elect understand that
their temporal peace is inescapably intertwined with that of
the reprobate.

Augustine's pessimistic view of human nature can be
seen to be reflected in his theory of political government.

Perhaps it shines through most clearly in his characteriza
tion of earthly governments as robber bands, but his pessi
mism colors much more of Augustine's political thought, for

example, his contention that one does not find true justice
and true peace among earthly governments.

Thus Augustine is pessimistic not only concerning
human nature; he is also pessimistic concerning the

City of God, bk. 4, chap. 4.

46ibid., bk. 19, chap. 26.
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capablllt.lea o£ earbhly governiaent.a.

He deniea t.o t.hem t.he

ablllt.y to achieve good except inaofar aa they are inatru-

ments of divine providonco-'^'^
However, deapite hia peaaimiam, Auguatine enjoina obe
dience to the civil authoritiea upon the elect while they
are in thia world.

He finda warrant for thia in3unction in

the New Teatament (for example, Romana 13:1-7).

Moreover,

Auguatine'a underatanding of the pervaaive providence of God
impela him in thia direction.

Since rulera occupy their

poeitiona in virtu© of that providential car©.^®

Sine© God

can and often doea work Hia will even in the hearta of

wicked men,^^ the elect person obeys his temporal ruler for
the aame sort of reasons he would obey any other manifesta
tion of God's ordering of the universe.

Augustine's theory laid the foundations for those
theories of political theology that came after it in western

medieval thought.

If the theory of the two cities moved the

Christian to act with justice toward hia neighbor and with

respect toward hia ruler, atill it promoted the idea of a
pious withdrawal from the world.

Moreover, aa the idea of

"^"^James V. Schall, "Political Theory and Political
Theology," Laval Theoloaiaue Philoaophiaue 31 (February
1975):27.

48Brown, Society. pp. 29-30.
49on Grace and Free Will, chap. 42.

SOgrown, Society, p. 30,
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t.he organized church being the aaaenbly of the elect in thia

world gained adherenta ao alao grew the idea of the church
aa an organization outaide of the control of earthly princea,
The pinnacle of auch thinking waa reached during the papacy
of Boniface VIII.

Boniface VIII and the Two Sworda

We remember Boniface VIII not becauae he developed the

theory of the two aword3--it had been articulated two centuriea before he became pope--but rather becauae he restated
<or caused to be restated) the theory and attempted to en

force it during his papacy.

Unfortunately for Boniface, hia

attempts were not universally well received, especially by

Phillip IV of France, who waa singularly uncongenial to the
theory.
Benedetto Gaetani earned hia doctorate in canon and

civil law prior to entering the service of the curia about
1278.

He waa one of the curia*'a chief canon lawyers when

the devout but incredibly naive Pietro di Hurrhone became

Pope Celeatine V.

His role in Celeatine'a subsequent unique

resignation from the papacy is still hotly debated.

What ie

known with certainty is that Gaetani waa an advisor to
Celeatine.

What is uncertain and disputed is the content

of the advice he gave.

Whatever that advice may have been, Celeatine resigned

the papacy leas than six months after hia election.

Ten
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daya lat.er, Benedet.t.o Gaet.ani becarae Pope Boniface VIII.
Anong hla flrat. acta, Boniface revoked "bhe extraordinary
favoura and privilegea** that had been granted by Celeatine^
went from Naplea to Rome to be crowned there thua removing

the papal court from Neapolitan influence, and placed
Celeatine under arrest.

It waa Boniface^a misfortune to become pope during a

period of some of the moat thorough change in the history of
the weatern world.

As Strayer describes it.

There is no doubt that the beginning of the change

in the climate of opinion came in the last quarter of the
thirteenth century. For once all of the indices agree-there waa a sharp break in politics and in economics, in
thought and in the arts. Young men who witnessed the
defeat of Manfred and the pious death of the crusading
St. Louis were hardly more than middle-aged when Man

fred's grandson reconquered Sicily from the papal cham
pion, and St. Louis's grandson attacked a pope. Scholars
who listened to the last lectures of Thomas Aquinas lived
to hear his basic belief in the unity of all knowledge

assailed. Sculptors who worked on the great cathedrals
in the 1270's had to accept the change in fashion which
substituted a pretty country girl with a baby for the

maoestic Virgin of the earlier period.

Business men and

land-owners saw mild prosperity and economic stability

give place to stagnation and erratic fluctuations in the
value of the currency.

The pope who waa attacked was Boniface; the attacker was
Philip IV of France.

Today we tend to see the various disputes between
princes and ecclesiastical authorities that occured so often

5lThe Catholic Encyclopedia. 12 vol. s.v. "Boniface
VIII,** by Thomas Destrich.

S^joseph R, Strayer, Western Europe in the Middle
Aoes (New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955>, pp. 189-90.
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In t.he late middle agea in terms of diaputea between church
and state.

This vision ia leas than precise.

We are fairer

to the personalitiea involved and better able to comprehend
the theories involved if we consider these diaputea as con

tests for power and authority between the individuals in
volved.

There were no nation states in the middle ages such

as we know now, and the Roman church was not then the well-

managed ecclesiastical organization we see today.
At the beginning of the thirteenth century. Innocent

III greatly enhanced the power of the papacy through his
administraive ability, his knowledge of canon and civil law,

and his willingness to use the ecclesiastical and civil

weapons available to him to impose his will upon various
princes of Europe.

At the beginning of the fourteenth cen

tury Boniface--blind to the changes in the times--failed

utterly in his attempt to emulate Innocent.

However that

failure produced the clearest statement of the theory of the
two swords.

The election of Celestine V had been no accident.

It

was a compromise achieved by a weary and near-desperate
college of cardinals only after two years of debate and
political infighting.

Celestine's election was a symptom

(as well as a cause> of the crumbling of the power of the
Roman church.

The college of cardinals had become so di

vided that in two years of deliberation no reasonable candi
date had been able to gain a majority of votes and thus the
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papacy.

The election of the elderly hermit did nothing to

correct this situation.

Boniface sought to correct this, as well as several

other, political problems using the techniques of firmness
and forcefulness used by Innocent III a century earlier.

However, Boniface was apparently unable to comprehend that
the environment in which he labored was far different from
that in which Innocent had worked.

Boniface had to deal

with sovereigns far more powerful than those encountered by
Innocent. He was at the helm of a ship awash in a degree of
factional strife such as was unthinkable in Innocent''a day.
If Boniface had an excellent command of canon and civil law,

this knowledge was negated by his ignorance concerning which
way the wind was blowing.

In his dispute with Philip IV

concerning how ecclesiastical income in France should be

dispersed, Boniface overextended himself.

In that over-

extension we find his downfall but we also find the clearest

publication of the theory of the two swords.
Philip was engaged in a war with England.
now, wars were expensive.

Then, as

Boniface wished the war to cease,

probably for a variety of reasons including his desires to
enhance the position of the papacy and to increase the in

come of the papal treasuries.53

Then too, as now, higher

taxes usually meant lower contributions.

In addition, the

53c, B. Previte-Orton, Outlines of Medieval History
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1929), p. 351.
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civil ruler could lay taxea on church properties when an
officer of the church held the property in virtue of a civil
office he might hold conjointly.

If these legitimate reductions in papal income hurt
Boniface^ he was more than stung when Philip imposed taxes

upon properties of the churches well above the accepted cus*tomary feudal levies.

In addition, the other combatant,

Edward I of England, was also attempting to collect a direct
tax from the clergy in his realm to finance his part in the
war.

Boniface responded to these threats to papal income
and, as he saw it, to papal power with the bull, Clericis

Laicoa.

One may get a taste of Boniface''s style from the

opening words of the bull.

Boniface Bishop,
the perpetual record
been very hostile to
it is clearly proved
time.S'^

servant of the servants of God, for
of the matter. That laymen have
the clergy antiquity relates; and
by the experiences of the present

Clericis Laicoa went on to forbid in the strongest

language possible the taxation of ecclesiastical properties

and persons.

It threatened excommunication for those who

attempted to impose or collect such taxes and deposition as
well as excommunication for those who paid such taxes.

In

addition, the lands where such transactions might take place

54cxerj^cis Laicos. in Henry Bettenaon, ed..
Documents of the Christian Church (London: Oxford University

Press, 1963>, pp. 157-59.
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were trO be pieced under bhe inberdicb.^^
Clericia lalcoa did nob explicibly pubilah bhe docbrine

of bhe bwo swords.

lb merely implied ib.

If bhe pope could

direcb monarchs in fiscal mabbers^ as Boniface claimed in

Clericia Laicoa bhab he could^ bhen obviously bhe pope ex-

cercised bemporal power over civil aubhoribies.
Clericia laicoa did nob have bhe resulb bhab Boniface

desired.

Philip banned furbher payaenba bo Rome by bhe

churches in France.

paid his bax.

Edward oublawed bhe clergy unbil bhey

Bobh were upheld by bheir aubjecba in bhese

acbions.

Boniface was compelled bo rebreab rapidly and bhab for
bwo reasons.

Firsb, reduced income from England and France

was preferable bo no income ab all, and Boniface needed in

come desperabely.

Second, Boniface had injured, insulbed,

and infuriabed bhe powerful Colonna family.

He needed mill-

bary aid from Philip bo remove bhis bhreab bo bhe power of
hia office aa well aa bo hia peraonal aafeby.

Thab being

bhe case, Boniface relenbed aboub a year afber publishing

Clericia laicoa and agreed bhab baxabion of clerica waa
permibbed.
However, Boniface waa nob finished aaserbing bhe power

and privilege of bhe papacy.

Edward I wished bo add Scob-

land bo hia realm by conqueab.

SSibid.

Boniface soughb bo reabore
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peace by declaring Scot-land t.o be a papal fief and bhen aumiRoning Edward to Rome to justify hia attack.

Edward# with

the vigorous support of his parliment# declined# stating
that the king of England was not accustomed to submit hia

policies and person to the judgment of a foreign court.
Meanwhile# Boniface managed simultaneously to alienate
Edward's customary foe# the far more dangerous Philip of
France•

Boniface was not reconciled to Philip's policy of pro

viding aid and comfort to the Colonna family and especially
to those members of it who had shown resistance to his elec

tion and to his papal policies.

For his part# Philip was

displeased by the conduct of the pope in reprimanding him in
regard to his conduct in his regal office.

Too# Philip

found objectionable remarks made by the Bishop of Pamiers#

the papal legate# expressing hia dissatisfaction with
Philip's rule.

Accused of making treasonable speeches and

of inciting rebellion# the bishop was arrested# tried# and
found guilty.

The bull Unara aanctam capped the exchange of letters#

ambassadors# and pronouncements that ensued.

It was this

bull# probably written by Aegidiua Colonna^^ that was the
^^Here we have one of those curiosities that makes the

study of medieval history fun. Aegidius Colonna was a mem
ber of the same Colonna family that Boniface was seeking to
destroy. He was a trusted advisor on canon law to the pope
who was the best canon lawyer to occupy the chair of Peter.

What motivated Aegidius to write the bull that established
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document. t.hat. set. £ort.h t.he doctrine of the two aworda with

the greateat force and clarity.

It read, in part,

. . . we learn from the worda of the Goapel that in
thia Church and in her power are two aworda, the apiritual and the temporal. For when the apoatlea aaid, ^Be
hold, here' (that ia, in the Church, aince it waa the
apoatlea who apoke) ^are two aworda'—the Lord did not

reply, ^It ia too much,' but ^It ia enough.'

Truly,

he who deniea that the temporal aword ia in the power
of Peter, miaunderatanda the worda of the Lord, ^Put up
thy aword into the aheath.' Both are in the power of
the Church, the apiritual aword and the material. But
the latter ia to be uaed for the Church, the former by
her; the former by the priest, the latter by kinga and

captaina but at the will and by the permiaaion of the
prieat. The one aword, then, ahould be under the other,
and temporal authority aubject to apirital. For when the

apostle says, ^there ia no power but of God, and the
powers that be are ordained of God' they would not be so
ordained were not one aword made subject to the other. .
Thua, concerning the Church and her power, ia the

prophecy of Jeremiah fulfilled, ^See, I have this day
aet thee over the nationa and over the kingdoma,' etc.

If, therefore, the earthly power err, it shall be judged

the absolute power of the pope over all men, including those

who were seeking to shelter hia family from the wrath of the
pope? Conventional wisdom has it that Aegidius deserted his
family in their hour of need and waa a loyal son of the
church. That simply will not wash for two reasons. First,
Aegidius waa assisted in achieving hia place of eccleaiaatical prominence by hia relatives in the college of cardi
nals, and Aegidius never broke off relations with hia family.
Such behavior would be inexplicable if Aegidius had in fact
turned hia back on hia family when he entered orders. Se
cond, in order for this theory to be convincing it must be
conceded that Aegidius waa so lacking in intelligence as to
believe that Philip would roll over and play dead once a

strongly worded papal bull waa waved in hia face. Neither
Aegidius'a writing nor hia conduct hint at any such gross
stupidity. To the contrary, Aegidius cornea down to ua as an
exceptionally smart churchman. There ia another explanation
for Aegidius'a writing Unam aanctara that wears far better.
Aegidius waa well aware of Boniface's designs on the Colonna
family and did what waa necessary to thwart them. He thua
composed Unam aanctam in the moat inflamatory language
possible, trusting that it would incite Philip to aet in
motion events similar to those that actually occurred.
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by the spiritual power; and if a lesser power err, it
shall be 3udged by a greater. But if the supreme power
err, it can only be 3Udged by God, not by man; for the
testimony of the apostle is "^The spiritual man 3udgeth
all things, yet he himself is 3udged of no man.^
For
this authority, although given to a man and exercised by
a man, is not human, but rather divine, given at God's
mouth to Peter and established on a rock for him and his

successors in Him whom he confessed, the Lord saying to
Peter himself, ^Whatsoever thou shalt bind,' etc. Who

ever therefore resists this power thus ordained of God,
resists the ordinance of God. . . . Furthermore we de

clare, state, define and pronounce that it is altogether
necessary to salvation for every human creature to be
6ub3ect to the Roman pontiff

The message of Unam sanctam is loud and clear.

pope is the supreme ruler of all mankind.

The

He possesses ab

solute power in spiritual matters over all others.

This

spiritual power he exercises through the Roman church.
also possesses absolute temporal power over all men.

He

This

power is directly applied by kinds and captains, but it may
be used by them only under the authority of the pope.

The

person who re3ects the absolute sovereignty of the pope in
all matters spiritual and temporal is damned.
Thus was the theory of Augustine twisted, augmented,
and stretched into something he would never have accepted.

What had been the spiritual community of the City of God now
was a very physical community with the pope as her absolute
ruler.

It was against the background of this medieval heri

tage that Luther would propound his doctrine of the two
kingdoms.

^"^Una sanctam in Bettonson, Documents, pp. 16061.

CHAPTER

VII

LUTHER'S TEACHING CONCERNING THE TWO KINGDOMS

In-troduction

In a sense, one may say -that, Martin Luther's teaching
concerning the two kingdoms represents a development and a
correction of the medieval teachings concerning the two
cities and the two swords.

We could then describe Luther's

teaching in terms of his correction of Augustine's idea of
the state and his correction of Boniface VIII's idea of the
church.

Certainly it is true that Luther's teaching does cor
rect these errors.

However, this is not the best way to

approach Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms, if only
because this is not the way Luther himself understood what

he was doing.

It is well to be cognizant of the precedents

Luther had in view when he developed his theory.

However,

it must also be remembered that Luther was an exegetical

theologian.

Thus, for Luther, sound doctrine was to be

drawn from the Scriptures and from no other source.^
^Martin Luther, First Lectures on the Psalms. II.
in the American Edition of Luther'a Works. 55 vols., ed.
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia

Publishing House, and Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1955- >,
11:327; et permuiti alia. The American Edition is hereafter
abbreviated "LW" and is cited by volume and page number.

One of the beat readily available discussions concerning
Luther's attitude toward the Scriptures remains M. Reu,
Luther and the Scriptures (Columbus, OH: Wartburg Press,

1944) also reprinted in The Sprinqfielder» vol. 24, no. 2.
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Luther^a Diacoverv o£ the Two Rules

Lut.her found t.wo rules or reigna preaent.ed In t.he
Bible.

One is a rule of love, a rule demanding that we love

the Lord God with all our heart, mind, and aoul, and that we

love our neighbor as we love ourselves.

For Luther, this

radical rule of love is both unalterable and unfulfillable.

Commenting on Matthew 5:19, Luther wrote,
"I will make them

Ci.e., "these commandments"3 very

strong," He says. Not only will I not abolish them.
But if any preacher relaxes or ignores the tiniest part,
he should know that he is no preacher of Mine, but is

damned and excluded from the kingdom of heaven.^
Having thus established the rule of love, Luther then
went on to excoriate those who had attempted to make this

rule fulfillable by diluting it, diluting it through the

substitution of human standards for divine.^
Having established the unalterability of the rule,
Luther went on to point to the fact that no one can fulfill
the demands of that rule.

He wrote,

I shall not go into the question now of how the law
is to be fulfilled so that no iota or dot of it is lost,

though at the same time we teach that no man can fulfill
it.

I have said that here Christ is not talking primar

ily about life, but about doctrine. He is not dealing
with the great chief doctrine of what He is and what He
gave us. We cannot be 3ustified or saved through the
teaching of the Law, which only brings us to the knowl
edge of ourselves, the knowledge that by our own ability
we cannot properly fulfill an iota of it. Once we have
become Christian through Baptism and faith, we do as we
can.

Still we can never take our stand before God on

^Luther, "The Sermon on the Mount," LW, 21:71,

3lbid., 2:71-72.
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t-hla basis, but. we must, always creep t.o Christ.. He has
fulfilled it all purely and perfectly, and He gives Him
self to us, together with His fulfillment. Through Him
we can take our stand before God, and the Law cannot in
criminate or condemn us. So it is true that all must be

accomplished and fulfilled even to the smallest dot, but

only through this one Man.^
Luther understood that the rule of love, as it is

given to us in Scripture, is a rule that no one can keep.
We Christians "do as much as we can," but we still fall far

short of the perfection that the rule of love demands.

We

attempt to follow the rule of love by attempting always to
deal with our neighbor in love and charity.

Yet, because

the sinful flesh is still with us, we fall far short of what
the rule of love demands.

But if the Christian is to be governed by the rule of

love, what is he to do when the peace of his community is
threatened either from without or from within?

Must the

Christian stand idly by and merely watch as a robber de

prives his neighbor of his property, stand there idly be
cause it would be unloving to use force in resisting the

preditations of the robber?

Must the Christian allow in

vading foreign armies to enter his community and to destroy
its peace, prosperity, and welfare, because it would be
unloving to use force to resist the invader?

If the Chris

tian is to be governed always and unalterably by the rule of
love, is he then forbidden to undertake those tasks of

4lbid., 21:72-73.
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governing t.hat. require bhe use of force or t,he direct.ing of
olhera to uae force?

Luther underatood that fallen man ia far removed from

what God had Intended him to be.

Though the unalterable

rule of love appliea to all^ there are in fact none who can
obey it.

The believer ia hindered by hia ainful fleah ao

that he faila to keep the rule of love.

The unbeliever ia

the alave of ain and of hia ainful fleah^ and thua he too

continually tranagreaaea the rule of love.

Therefore God

haa provided another rule# a rule of compulaion and of law.
God haa provided thia rule of compulaion and of law ao that
evil can in aome part be reatrained and thua people aurvive
upon thia earth.

Luther wrote#

There are few true bellevera# and atill fewer who
live a Chriatian life# who do not reaiat evil and indeed
themaelvea do no evil. For thia reaaon God haa provided

for them

Ci.e.# for the ainneral a different government

beyond the Chriatian eatate and kingdom of God. He haa
aub^ected them to the aword ao that# even though they
would like to# they are unable to practice their wickedneaa# and if they do practice it they cannot do ao with
out fear or with aucceaa and impunity.

In the aame way

a aavage wild beaat ia bound with chaina and ropea ao
that it cannot bite and tear aa it would normally do#

even though it would like to; whereaa a tame and gentle
animal needa no reatraint# but ia harmleaa deapite the

lack of chains and ropes.^
Luther added#
If thia were not ao# men would devour one another#

seeing that the whole world ia evil and that among
thousands there ia scarcely a single true Chriatian.

^Luther# "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It
Should Be Obeyed#*' LW. 45:90.
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No one could support, wife and child, feed himself, and

serve God.

The world would be reduced bo chaos.^

Luther was not misled concerning either the saving

power of the Gospel or the depravity of man.

Natural man,

having turned his back on God in sinfulness, also has turned
his back on love.

The natural man usually is not motivated

by words of kindness and love.

To attempt to do so is as

foolish as turning the wolf loose in the sheep fold, admon

ishing all to live together in harmony.^

Instead, the

natural man must be restrained by means of the rule of com
pulsion and law.

Luther taught that God has established the rule of

love to govern the conduct of one individual toward another.
However, no individual follows the rule of love.

Therefore,

it is necessary that God establish the rule of compulsion
and law in order to protect persons the one from the other.
However, this rule of compulsion and law is not to be
enforced by each individual in his own right over against
the rest of the world.

and desolation.

This would result in chaos, anarchy,

The rule of compulsion and law is to be

exercised by those whom God has commissioned to exercise it.

Luther*a Teaching Concerning the Orders

Luther taught that God has organized this world into
orders.

Luther had a functional view of an order.

He

tended to define each order in terms of its duties and

^Ibid., 45:91.

"^ibid., 45:92.
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reaponBibili'blee bo bhe nex9hbor»^

Lubber found bhe dublee

o£ each order bo be aeb forbh in bhe Scripburea.

Moreover,

bhe dubiea an individual had in virbue of hia membership ia
love boward all men.

Lubher was aware of bhia benaion bebween bhe dubiea of

a given peraon aa person and bhab person's dubiea aa a mem
ber of an order.

He wrobe,

. . . we muab diabinguish bebween an occupabion and bhe
man who holds ib, bebween a work and bhe man who does

ib. An occupabion or a work can be good and righb in
ibself and yeb be bad and wrong if bhe man who does bhe

work is evil or wrong or does nob do his work properly.^
Lubher wenb on bo give an example of whab he meanb.
He wrobe.

The occupabion of a judge ia a valuable divine office.
This is brue bobh of bhe office of bhe brial judge who
declares bhe verdicb CMundrichber3 and bhe execubioner
who carries oub bhe senbence CFauab- or Schar£richber3

Bub when bhe office ia aaaumed by one bo whom ib has nob
been commibbed or when one who holds ib righbly uses ib

bo gain riches or populariby, bhen ib ia no longer righb
or good. The married ababe is precious and godly, bub
bhere are many raacala and scoundrels in ib. Ib ia bhe
same way wibh bhe profession or work of bhe soldier; in
ibself ib is righb and godly, bub we muab see bo ib bhab
bhe persons who are in bhis profession and who do bhe
work are bhe righb kind of persona, bhab ia, godly and

uprighb, as we shall hear.^®
In bhe diabincbion bhab he made bebween bhe office and

bhe individual, Lubher solved a problem bhab had plagued and

®See, for example, bhe "Table of Dubiee" Lubher drew
up for bhe Small Cabechism.

^Lubher, "Whebher Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," LW,
46:94.

lOlbid.
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dia1iort.ed pollt.lcaX t.heory alnce lihe t.lne o£ Auguatilne.

The

Chrlalilany according t.o Auguat.ine^ la a clt.lzen of -the City
of God.

Aa auch, he la merely a vlaltor here, a pilgrim on

hla way through thla life to hla home with God.
not dlapute thla.

Luther did

However, Auguatlne went further to hold

that government waa a feature of the City of thla World,
that la, of the maaa of perdition among whom the elect live.
Thua the redeemed waa viewed aa being, by virtue of hla re

demption, a foreigner to the affalra of atate.
denied.

Thla Luther

Luther claimed that civil government waa compoaed

of ordera eatabllahed by God.

Thla being the caae, the

Chrlatlan waa In no way a foreigner to civil government, ao

long aa he exerclaed the office In the manner that fulfilled

the purpoae for which God had eatabllahed It.

For Luther, a

man la no more aullled by being a good aoldler than he la
aullled by being a good huaband.

Civil Government aa Divine Ordera

Luther aaw civil government aa conalatlng of ordera
eatabllahed In thla world by God.

In commenting on 1 Peter

2:13, he wrote.

We do not owe the government obedience for Ita own

aake, aaya St. Peter, but for the aake of God, whoae
children we are.

Thla muat Induce ua to be obedient,

not the thought that our obedience la a merltorloua
deed.

For what I do for God'a aake, thla I muat do

without recompenae and to aerve Him. Therefore I muat
be willing to do for nothing everything Hla heart dealrea.

But why ahould one be aubject to the government

for God'a aake?

Becauae It la God'a will that malefac-

tora be puniahed and that benefactora be protected. In
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order that in thia way unity may remain in the world.
Therefore we ahould further external peace. God wanta
ua to do thia. For aince we are not all believera, but

the great ma3ority are unbelievera^ God haa regulated
and ordained mattera thia way in order that people of
the world might not devour one another. The government
ahould wield the aword and reatrain the wicked if they

do not want to have peace.

They have to obey. Thia He
accompliahea through the government^ ao that in thia way

the world is ruled well everywhere.^^
The Christian acknowledges that civil government con
sists of orders ordained and established by God.

Therefore

the Christian serves and obeys his government in order to

serve and obey his God.

Does thia apply to the unbeliever?

Is he to be urged to obey the government because it is the

pious thing to do?

No.

Rather, the unbeliever is to obey

the government because it is the reasonable thing to do.
Luther wrote,

. . . it is not the law of the fiat but the law of the
head that must rule—not force but wisdom and reason—

among the wicked as well as among the good.^2
In his "Proposal on the Existing Order" Luther made a simi
lar statement.

He wrote.

This recent turmoil [i.e. the Peasant Wars] has

taught us a good lesson, since we see well enough what
kind of rubbish appears before our eyes when we do not
see to it that the feelings of the common man are satis
fied and harmonized to the extent that thia is possible.

Thus it is necessary that he be handled not only with
force—as is now the case—but also with reason. For
force alone without reason cannot last and only serves

to keep the subjects in a state of eternal hatred over

^^Luther, "Sermons on the First Epistle of St. Peter,"
LW. 30:74.

i^Luther, "A Sermon on Keeping Children in School,"
LW. 46:239.
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agalnat. "bhelr governing aut.horit.iea^ aa all hiat.ory

poin-ba out to us.^^
Sheer force alone will not auffice for the civil gov"

ernment.

It muat be force adrainiatered in a logical and

reaaonable aanner.

A knowledge of the revealed Law ia not

neceaaary^ but a reaaonable adminiatration of the Law aa it
ia written in the heart of each man in the natural knowledge

of the Law ia neceaaary for the right adminiatration of a
civil government.

Luther wrote,

God givea ua rational ability ao that we can maater
phyaical affaira, educate our children, adminiater the
houaehold, etc. Scripture ia here unneceaaary, for God
haa diatributed thia rational ability among all nationa.

It ia, therefore, not neceaaary that He aend down a word
from heaven.

The Two Kingdom

When we examine what Luther haa aaid concerning the

two modes of existing or interacting, we take care to bring

together all the atranda of hia thought.

If we do not, we

shall be guilty of presenting a distorted or adumbrated ver
sion of Luther's teaching.
We have seen that Luther held that each individual in

this world ia to interact with all other people in two ways.

In one mode of conduct, the individual acts according to his

^^Luther, "A Proposal on the Existing Order," trans.
Louis Reith, in Two Kingdoms and One World, ed., Karl Hertz

(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976), p. 56.
^'^Luther, "Sermons on Exodus," trans. Louis Reith,
in Hertz, Two Kingdoms. p. 58.
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poslt.lon among t.he orders God has est.abllshed t.o govern t.hia
world.

According t.o the rules of the order or orders he

occupies, the person rationally deals with those about him
in his official capacity.

Note, too, that one may belong to more than one order

at any given time.

Thus the headsman may also be a father.

In his capacity as father he has the right and duty to spank
his child.

In his capacity as headsman he has the right and

duty to behead a convicted murderer.

However, this headsman/

father has neither the right nor the duty to spank the mur
derer or to behead his child.

The duties of the orders are

specific to the order and do not inhere to the occupant of
that order when he acts in a capacity other than the duties
of that order.

In the world as it now exists the orders are necessary

because of the sinful nature of man.

Were all people to act

under the rule of love, the various orders of the world as
we now know them would be unnecessary.

No police, no armies,

no courts, no headsmen would be necessary, for all would
love one another as they loved themselves, and their every

action toward the neighbor would be governed by the rule of
universal love.

However, the world as it now exists is not a world of
love but rather a world of sin and evil.

Thus the orders

are "emergency repairs,** temporary and temporal adjustments
established by God in and for this dying, sinful world to

102

preserve some degree o£ order unt.ll the end comes.

The

orders, therefore, are not, so to apeak, the proper will of
God but are rather the will of God as it has been mediated

by the human condition, by the circumstances of this world,
the will of God as it applies now, in time, to us who are
fallen and do not live according to God's loving will.

This

will governs the outward and physical aspects of man's rela

tionship to man and to the other objects of his environment.
Reason and logic hold sway here.

This is the kingdom of

God's left hand.

The temptation exists to stop at this point, but were
we to do so we would falsify Luther and turn his teaching

into an unscriptural formalism and legalism.
Luther never exempted anyone from the rule of love.
This is the rule that governs relationships in the kingdom
of God's right hand, the kingdom that is ruled by God's

proper rule, since God is love.

In this kingdom, truth is

now perceived by faith rather than by sight or logic, but
that which we now believe we shall, in the eschaton, see.

The rule of love is eternally and universally applicable.

Moreover, this rule of love is now universally rejected.

No

one, according to Luther, has followed the rule of love that

applies in the kingdom of the right hand, no one, that is,
but Jesus Christ Himself.

Jesus Christ, true God begotten

of the Father from eternity, and true Man, born of the

blessed virgin Mary, has fulfilled the rule of love.

He has
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fulfilled the Law for all men.

Thoae who, by the power of

the Holy Ghoat operative In Word and Baptlan, believe that
Jesua la their Savior, who believe that He fulfilled the Law
for then and then auffered and died to pay the penalty for
the slna of a fallen mankind--thoae who believe In Jeaua

Chrlat are aaved and are thereby cltlzena of the kingdom of

God'a right hand, living therein under the rule of love.
Thua It la that the Goapel, the meaaage that God loved
the world ao that He aacrlflced Hla Son for the alns of the

world, holds away In the kingdom of the right hand, while In
Its turn the kingdom of the left hand la ruled by compulsion
and law.

In the kingdom of the right hand the Goapel la

received by faith.

In the kingdom of the left hand, the Law

la acknowledged by reason.

The person who la a member of

the kingdom of the right hand. Insofar aa he la a member of
that kingdom, needs no law to show him what to do.

He does

that which la right, since. Insofar aa he la a member of the

kingdom of the right hand, he la motivated by love.

How

ever, no one In this world la entirely ruled by love.

No

one In this world lives entirely In the kingdom of the right

hand.

Therefore, even thoae who are Christiana need law and

compulsion Insofar as they are still membera of the kingdom
of the left hand, that la. Insofar aa they are still subject

to the temptations of Satan, the world, and their sinful
flesh.

The kingdom of the left hand, ruled by compulsion and
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law^ exlat.s because none o£ us loves as he should.

It.

exlst-s because^ were It. not. t.o exist.^ men would devour one

anobher, and bhis world would soon be reduced bo chaos and
ruin.

lb exisbs, in shorb^ for bhe peace of bhis world and

for bhe welfare of bhose living in bhis world.

lb is wibhin

bhe framework of bhe kingdom of bhe lefb hand bhab one beab
undersbands Lubber's beaching concerning civil governmenb.

Moreover, ib is also wibhin bhis sebbing bhab one can besb
comprehend Lubher's beaching concerning bhe 3usb war.

CHAPTER

VIII

THEOLOGICAL TEACHINGS CONCERNING
PARTICIPATION IN WARFARE

Introduction

Christianity haa long been divided concerning the

question of whether it is permissible for a Christian to
participate in warfare.

In general^ three basic views have

been put forward in answer to this question; namely paci
fism, the just war teaching, and the idea of the crusade or
the holy war.

Pacifism prohibits the Christian from partic

ipating in any sort of warfare as a combatant.

The just war

teaching seta forth certain conditions which must be ful
filled if the participation of the Christian as a combatant
in a conflict is to be justifiable.

The crusade idea places

the authority for waging war directly in the hands of the
church.

As Roland H. Bainton pointed out.

Pacifism is thus often associated with withdrawal, the

just war with qualified participation, and the crusade
with the dominance of the church over the world.^
It would seem likely that all three of these views

have been present in the church in varying degrees, cer

tainly since late in the first century of the Christian era.

^Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War
and Peace (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), p. 15.
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Pacl£iam

Paclfiam haa been propoaed aa the appropriate reaponae

of Chrlatlana to military aervice aa a combatant aince very

early in the hiatory of the church.

Some denominational for

example, the Society of Frienda and the Mennonitea, eapouae

pacifiam aa the official teaching of the denomination.

Theae

denominationa are often referred to aa the "Peace Churchea."

However, pacifiata are alao to be found in virtually every
Chriatian denomination.

The pacifiat placea little confidence in the political

proceaaea of thia world.

In general, hia reaponae to worldly

aociety ia one of withdrawal.

The withdrawal may be merely

the refuaal to take part aa a combatant in warfare, or it

may extend to a refuaal to take any part in the political
proceaa or even to a removal from the world into a colony

composed of those holding like beliefs.2
It haa been claimed that pacifiam waa the view held

univeraally in the church prior to the end of the firat cen

tury.^

However, a careful review of the scant literature

available to ua from that period tends to refute thia
theory.

Aa Adolf Harnack haa pointed out, statements that

^Ibid., p. 15.

^Ibid., p. 14.

See also C. John Cadoux, The Early

Chriatian Attitude to War (London: Headly Bros., 1919), p
17, pp. 49-160.
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pacl£lani was t.he universally held teaching o£ t.he Christ.ian
church of the £lrat century are based upon extrapolations

backward £roin subsequent statements or upon arguments £rom

silence.^

Moreover, such statements overlook the deep

o££ense that would have been o££ered by the use o£ military

metaphors by the apostles and the apostolic £athers in
urging Christians to live lives o£ stead£aat Christian

duty.5
Bainton quotes the words o£ Celsus that have been used

by some^ to defend the idea that it was customary for Chris
tians at that time <ca. A-D. 170> to avoid military service.

Celsus is alleged to have written.

^Adolf Harnack, Militia Christi, trans. David Grade
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 19dl>, pp. 65-66.

^Thus, for instance, Ignatius, in his letter to Polycarp, uses military metaphors, writing, "Give satisfaction
to Him in whose ranks you serve and from whom you get your

pay. Let none of you prove a deserter" (6:2). Just how out
o£ place such words would have been in a pacifist church
where military service was considered to be per se immoral
can be imagined by transferring the metaphor from one of
military service to one of prostitution. We would find ad
vice to "Get out there and score for your Great Pimp, etc."

entirely unacceptable in any context. Moreover, while
Ignatius writes repeatedly concerning the fact that he is
a prisoner condemned to martyrdom, he does not condemn the
profession of those who have brought him into this condi
tion.

It is true that he describes his escort of soldiers

as "ten leopards," but his condemnation is of their private
conduct, not of their profession (Romans 5:1). Polycarp
urges prayers for the authorities who have condemned him
(Philippians 12:3). However, the context prevents this
exhortation from being interpreted as either support or
condemnation of service as a military or civil official.

^Joan D. Tooke, The Just War in Aouinas and Grotius
(London: S. P. C. K., 1965), p. 1.

lOd

If all men were to do the same as you, there would be

nothing to prevent the king from being left in utter
solitude and desertion and the forces of the empire
would fall into the hands of the wildest and most law

less barbarians.^
As Bainton notes, i£ Celsus thought that all Christians were

pacifists, he erred.

At the very time that Celsus and

Origen engaged in their controversy, we find that Chris
tians were serving in the Thundering Legion under Marcus

Aurelius.®
There have been those who have found considerable sup

port in the writings of Tertullian for the theory that the
Christian church was universally pacifistic in the first two

centuries-^

However, it would seem that these writings will

not bear this load.

First, it is well to note that the wit

ness of Tertullian is not uniform.

In his Apology., Tertullian

notes, without censure, that Christiana were serving in the

army.^^

We find strong condemnation of military service

in Tertullian's later writings, but these come from the

period after he had espoused the Montanist heresy.

There

fore, these writings should not be taken as indicative of

"^Bainton, Attitudes, p. 66.

It is beet to note that

all that we know concerning Celsus's comments comes from

Origen'a response to it. Contra Celsura. While we may not
doubt Origen's accuracy in quotation, it is permitted to
suggest that he, like all other critics, has been selective
in quoting passages.

^Bainton, Attitudes, p. 68.

^E.g., Cadoux, Attitude, pp. 106-119.
lOTertullian, Apology. 32,
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the poaition of the Christian church but rather aa indica
tive of the position of the Montanista in the regard.
At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that
there is some indication that at the close of the second

century there were a large number of pacifists numbered
among the Christians.

Origen'a remarks to the effect that

Christiana would not fight under the emperor support this
contention.

It should, however, be remembered that it

was often the duty of the soldier, as proof of his loyalty,
to make a sacrifice to the emperor.

This idolatry would

have been totally unacceptable to a Christian.

Thus, it is

safe to assume that many Christians refused to enter mili

tary service in the Roman legions not because they were
pacifists but because they were not idolators.
An examination of those Biblical texts used by Chris

tian pacifists to support their theory shows that they rely
rather heavily on texts from the Sermon on the Mount.

^

Lutheran theologian would point out that they confuse pre

cepts from the rule of love with those in the rule of com
pulsion and force.

Many theologians who would not accept

^^Origen, Contra Gelsura, VIII, 73.
^^"BXessed are the meek:
earth" (Matt. 5:5>.

for they shall inherit the

"Blessed are the peacemakers:

shall be called the children of God" (Matt. 5:9).

for they
"Resist

not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek,
turn to him the other also" (Matt. 5:39>.

^^Martin Luther has written concerning the impropriety
and inadvisability of this practice, "If anyone attempts to

no

the Lutheran terminology or the Lutheran distinction between
the two rules would still agree that pacifists use these

verses without giving due regard to the context and thereby
misinterpret them.

Lutheran theologians might also notice

that this interpretation of these passages reduces God's
radical rule of love to the obedience to a carefully cir

cumscribed set of commands, thereby violating the statement

of the Lord when He preached the Sermon on the Mount con

cerning the unalterable character of these very command
ments.^"^

The Just War Theory

The theory of the just war antidates the birth of the
Christian church.

It would seem that the theory was first

developed by the Greeks and later expanded by the Romans.

rule the world by the gospel and to abolish all temporal law
and sword on the plea that all are baptized and Christian,
and that, according to the gospel, there shall be among them
no law or sword—or need for either—pray tell me, friend,

what would he be doing? He would be loosing the ropes and
chains of the savage wild beasts and letting them bite and
mangle everyone, meanwhile insisting that they were harm
less, tame, and gentle creatures; but I would have the
proof in my wounds." "On Termporal Authority," in the Ameri
can Edition of Luther's Works. 55 vols. ed. Jaroslav Pelikan
and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House

and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-

>, 45:91.

i^Matt. 5:17-20.

^^Bainton, Attitudes, pp. 17-43.

I am deeply in

debted to the late Dr. Bainton for his advice that I take a
careful look at the classical Greek and Roman roots of the

just war theory.

This advice, as well as his encouragement

in this project, have been invaluable.

Ill

Thus the theologiana of the early Christian church had this
heritage upon which to draw.

Apparently^ Aristotle was the first to use the tern

"just war."^^

He wrote.

And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a
natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition
includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice

against wild beasts, and against men who, though in
tended by nature to be governed, will not subnit; for

war of such a kind is naturally just.^^
Aristotle was what we would call today a natural law
theorist.

In his scheme of natural law, some men were

equipped and destined by their very nature to rule and ad
minister.

These were the Hellenes.

destined, by and large, to slavery.

The rest of mankind was

Thus when the Greek

army invaded a foreign land, took its wealth, and enslaved
its people, the army was only doing what came naturally, and
that war was called just-

Aristotle wrote.

Neither should men study war with a view to the en
slavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved;

but first of all they should provide against their own
enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for
the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exer
cising a general despotism, and in the third place they
should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to
bo slaves.^®
When we examine Aristotle's definition, we find it at

the same time too narrow and too broad to suit us.

^^Bainton, Attitudes, p. 39.
I'^Aristotle, Politics, I, 1256b, 23-26.
^®Aristotl©, Politics, VII, 1333b, 37-133.

It is
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too narrow from the point of view that only Hellenes nay

wage a 3ust war.

Xt is too broad in that it allows and^ in

fact, enjoins aggressive war for the purpose of national
enrichment.

However, we must not charge Aristotle with having a

bellicose spirit and seeing in war a panacea for all sorts
of national ills.

Aristotle was well aware that the prac

tice of waging needless wars often led to a national dete
rioration, and he condemned such a policy

Rather, as we

have seen, Aristotle considered war as a means to an end and
never as an end in itself.

Aristotle's concept of the just war was a moral as

opposed to a legal concept.

Thus, in practice, it was

difficult to distinguish a just war from a merely successful
one.

There were no laws governing the conduct of war, and

there was no tribunal where a charge of violating the cus

toms concerning the just war could be tried.

However, de

spite these shortcomings, Aristotle's ideas carried great
influence upon those who came after him.

Rome made a significant contribution to just war

theory by developing a much more fully articulated concep
tion of just causes for waging a war.

Comparing the causes

l^ibid.

^^Aristotle, Politics. VII, 1334a, 7-8.
^Iprederick Russell, The Just War in the Middle
Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 4.
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of war to the remediea possible to an individual upon the
breach of a contract, the Romans determined that every just
war must be the occasion for the wronged state to seek com

pensation and redress, acting both as the judge and as the

advocate in its own cause.22

That being the case, Cicero

could hold that no war was just unless it was waged to re

cover lost goods.

In the category of goods Cicero included

anything for which satisfaction might be demanded, whether
it be territory, other property, or incorporeal rights.
Thus, Cicero could logically teach that warfare was not a
vengeful exercise in violence, but to the contrary, a pious
exercise of justice, occasioned by the misconduct of the

enemy.23
In addition to clarifying the idea that a proper de
claration of war must be issued for the subsequent conflict

to be justified.

This process of declaration of war in

cluded a demand upon the foreign power to redress the wrong
that had been suffered by the Romans.

If, after thirty-

three days, this demand was not met, the fetial priests
would issue the formal declaration of war when so authorized

by the senate and the Roman people.

This process meant that

the just war was also a religious war.

If the war was pros

ecuted in accordance with the proclamation of the fetial

22russo11, Just War, pp. 4-5.

23ibid., p. 5.

114

prleat.a, the war waa conaldered to be a bellua plum* a

pious or a dutiful war>^^

Tenny Franks discussing this

practice, haa written.

Every general handbook on international law begins
with a chapter describing the remarkable institution of
the Roman Fetial college, a aemirellgioua, aemipolitical
board which from time immemorial supervised the rites

peculiar to the swearing of treaties and declaration of
war, and which formed as it were a court of first in
stance in such questions of international disputes as

the proper treatment of envoys and the execution of
extradition. Polybius, the first foreign student of
Roman statecraft, quickly noticed this institution as

unique <xiii.3 and frag. 157>; Hugo Grotius, the father
of modern international law, pointed it out as a worthy
example for his degenerate day, and many are the
students of history who, like Bossuet, Maine, Mommsen,
and Bryce, have remarked upon its high significance.
The most noteworthy point in the practices of the fetial
board is doubtless the assumption, which underlay every

treaty as well as every declaration of war, that peace
was the normal international status and that war was

3ustified only on the score of an unjust act, as, for
instance, the breach of a treaty, a direct invasion, or
the aiding of one's enemies. Such is surely the impli
cation of the formulae used at the opening of a war, as

in the following, preserved by Livy (i. 32. 7-10): "Hear
me, Jupiter, I call you to witness that that nation is
umust and does not duly practice righteousness," and

again "if I umuatlv or imniouslv demand that the afore
said offenders be surrendered then permit me not to

return to my country-"25
In addition, for a war to be just, it was to be con

ducted using justifiable means.

Frederick Russell comments,

**For Cicero, wars should be won by virtue and courage rather

than by base* infamous or treacherous means."26

Thus faith

24ibid.* p. 6.

25Tenny Frank, "The Import of the Fetial Institution,
Classical Philology 7 (July 1922):335.

26Russell, Just War, p. 6.
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was t.o be observed wlbh bhe enemy In such

and safe conduces.

mat.t.era as bruces

In "theory^ at. least., war was t,o be waged

against. combat.ant.s, and bhose who had baken no part. In resisbing bhe armies of Rome were t.o be spared.

In addibion,

mercy was bo be shown in vicbory.27
Augusbine amalgamabed bhe Greek and Roman beachinga
concerning bhe jusb war wibh bhe informabion he gabhered
from bhe Chrisbian Scripbures.

Thab he did so skillfully

and persuasively is perhaps besb demonsbrabed by bhe facb
bhab his concepbs of bhe jusb war are, by and large, bhose
which have served large segmenbs of Chrisbendom in bhe
millennium and a half since he wrobe bhem as a basis for

discussion concerning bhe jusbice and bhe recbibude of parbicipabion in warfare.
lb is well bo nobe ab bhis point bhab we find nothing

in bhe writings of Augusbine bhab would be considered as

being milibariabic or as glorifying either military service
or warfare.

Augustine's remarks concerning war are ab bhe

very least always sober, and bhey are often clearly sorrow
ful.

His own experiences as well as bhe experiences of

others who lived contemporaneously wibh him during the de
cline of bhe western Roman world would have allowed him bo

evaluate quite accurately bhe glory, or bhe lack of it, bo
be found in warfare.

27ibid., p. 7.

From bhe comments concerning war found
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in his own writings, we may conclude that his knowledge o£
the conduct of warfare confirmed his pessimistic view of
mankind.

War, Augustine believed, was to be waged in order that

peace might prevail.

Thus, in a letter to Boniface, then

governor of Africa, he wrote.
Your will ought to hold fast to peace with war as
the result of necessity, that God may free you from the

necessity and preserve you in peace. Peace is not
sought for the purpose of stirring up war, but war is
waged for the purpose of securing peace. Be, then, a
peacemaker even while you make war, that by your victory
you may lead those whom you defeat to know the desira
bility of peace.

Another possible ob3ect of a just war might be to vin

dicate justice, but Augustine felt that this object might
often be so difficult to achieve that a war might be fought
for it in vain.

Cicero had said that wars might be waged

justly in pursuit of a nation's safety or of its honor.
Augustine pointed out that in the case of the Saguntines
these two objects conflicted one with the other.

Thus,

while the Saguntines preserved their honor by going to war,

they did so only at the coat of their very existence as a
free nation.^^
Augustine wrote.

^^Augustine, Contra Fauatum. 22, 75.

29Augustine, Letter 169.
^^Augustine, The Citv of God. 22, 6.
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Let. it. be neceaslLy^ not. choice^ Lhat. kllla your

warring enemy.

Juat. aa violence ia met.ed out. t.o him who

rebela and reaiata, ao mercy ia due him who ia defeated

and captured, eapecially when no disturbance of peace ia
to be feared

In light of this advice, we can aee that Auguatine felt that
war waa to be waged without taking pleaaure in the trials
and the sufferings of the defeated foe.

Rather than fight

from motives of hatred, anger, and vengeance, a just war was

to be waged in a disposition of Christian love, according to
Auguatine.

Thus Auguatine could write.

If the earthly state observes those Christian teachings,
even war will not be waged without kindness, and it will
be easier for a society whose peace is baaed on piety

and justice to take thought for the conquered.^2
Augustine believed that the appropriate inner attitude
of Christian love would reveal itself in the way in which

the war waa conducted.

Auguatine would seem to have adopted

the rules of classical Roman antiquity in this regard.

Faith was to be kept with the enemy insofar as treaties,
truces, and safe conducts were concerned.

There was to be

no wanton violence, looting, or massacre.

Atrocities were

forbidden, although it would eeem that ambush was allowed.
Auguatine further held that for a war to be just it
must be undertaken under correct auspices, that is, it was

to be waged only with the authority of the sovereign.

^^Augustine, Letter 189.

^^Augustine, Letter 138.
^^Bainton, Attitudes p. 58.

In

118

hia t.hought. in t.his regard, Augushine followed the lead of
Anbroae in dividing all Christendom into two classes.

Those

in public authority may take human life in support of the
common peace.

However, the private citizen may not exercise

violence, since for him to do so would be to give way to

ignoble emotions of revenge or anger.

Thus the Christian

soldier, acting in his capacity as a soldier, must kill in
warfare with as much skill and efficiency as he can muster;

acting, however, in hia capacity as a private person, he may

not use violence, even in defence of his own life.^^

The

clergy and those in religious orders were forbidden to take

any part as a combatant in war.^®
In point of fact, it is probably this last limitation,

coupled with his dependence on Cicero and his very pessimis
tic view of the vast ma3ority of mankind as a maaaa perdita

that laid Augustine's theory of a just war open to abuse.
We know that Augustine was familiar with the writings

of Cicero, for not only does he use the ideas of the Roman

statesman but ho also in places quotes his very words.36

Cicero, in his writings, discusses fetial law.37

it, there

fore, seems extremely unlikely that Augustine was not familiar

34Bainton, Attitudes, pp. 97-98.
35ibid.

36£,g,^ The Citv of God. 22, 6, refers to Cicero,
The Republic 3, 23.

37E.g., De Officiis. 1, 35-56.
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with fetial law and custom.

In Augustine's view, it was the task of the civil gov
ernment to uphold and protect the church.

Moreover, it was

the task of the church to advise the government in those

matters where the work of the government affected the wel
fare of the church.

Augustine came to hold this view all

the more strongly as he fought against the Donatists, a
schismatic sect who often resorted to violence in thier dis

putes with the Catholics.

Therefore, Augustine could write

openly to Donatus, the proconsul, concerning the fact that

by means of his civil power and authority, which, of course,
include the application of violence and force if need be, he
has come to defend the church against her enemies.
From her it was but a short step to the concept of the

state waging war on the authority of God Himself, directed
and guided in this by the church.

Augustine found numerous

examples of just this sort of war in the history of Israel
recorded in the Old Testament, forgetting or perhaps never

realizing that the people of God in the Old Testament were

not completely analogous with the church of God in the New
Testament.

In Augustine we find the first well-rounded statement
of the Christian concept of the just war.

3®Augustine, Letter 100.
^^Russell, Just War, pp. 22-23.

However, here too
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we find the first seeds of the idea that would be developed

into the idea of the crusade later in the middle ages.

It

is this imprecision in the thought of Augustine that con
tributed to the situation Russell describes when he writes.

In the Middle Ages the distinction between holy war,
crusade and just war were difficult to draw in theory
and were glossed over by those concerned to justify a
particular war. In the heat of combat and controversy,
belligerents forsook the more restrained just war for
the holy war. At the moment a just war was deemed nec

essary, it easily became a holy war that pursued the
supreme goals of the belligerents.
There were a number of medieval theologians who wrote

concerning the concept of a just war in the millennium fol
lowing the death of Augustine.

Of these we might mention

Isadore of Seville, Pope Nicholas I, and Gratian.^^

How

ever, it was Thomas Aquinas, writing some eight centuries

after Augustine, who next made a notable contribution to the
Christian teaching concerning the just war.

We find his

contribution contained in two of his writings, the Summa
Theolooica and the De Reono. Ad Reaem Cvori.

In the Summa Theolooica. Secunda Secundae, Quaestio

XL, Thomas dealt with four questions concerning the partici

pation of a Christian as a combatant in war.

Introducing

the discussion, he wrote.

'^^Russell, Just War, p. 2.
^Ipor a brief but careful summary of the contributions
of these theologians, see Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and
Grotius. pp. 12-20.
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Ue muat. now conalder war, under which head t-here are

four points of inquiry: <1) Whether some kind of war is
lawful?
<2> Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?
<3> Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay am
bushes?
<4> Whether it is lawful to fight on holy

daye?42
Concerning the first question regarding whether waging
war is ever licit, Thomas discusses first the objections
that had been raised to the idea, as was the custom in the

method of presentation commonly used at that time.

Stating

the first and most important objection to waging war, Thomas
wrote.

It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war.

Be

cause punishment is not to be inflicted except for sin.
Now those who wage war are threatened by our Lord with

punishment according to Matthew xxvi. 52: All that take
the sword shall perish with the sword.

Therefore all

wars are unlawful.

In discussing this first and broadest objection,
Thomas cited Augustine to the effect that had war been pro

hibited, those soldiers who sought advice of the Lord and of

the Apostles, as recorded in the Gospels, would have been
counselled to changed their profession.
this did not happen.

In fact, however,

Instead they were advised to be con

tent with their salary earned as soldiers.'*'^
Thomas then continued.

^^Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloaica. Ila Ilae, Q. XL.
^^Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologies. Ila Ilae,
Q. XL, i.

44ibid.
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. . . in order for a war to be juat, three thinga are
neceaaary. Firat the authority of the aovereign by
whose command the war ia to be waged. For it ia not the
buaineaa of a private individual to declare war, because
he can aeek redress of his rights from the tribunal of
his superior. Moreover, it is not the business of a
private individual to summon together people, which has
to be done in

wartime.

And aa the care of the common

weal ia committed to those who are in authority, it is
their business to watch over the common

weal of the

city, kingdom, or province subject to them.

And just aa

it ia lawful for them to have recourse to the sword

in

defending that common weal against internal distur
bances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the
aword in

vain: for he ia God*a minister, an avenger to

execute wrath upon him that doth evil! so, too, it is
their buaineaa to have recourse to the sword of war in de

fending the common weal against external enemies. . .
Here we see that Thomas has established Scriptural and logi

cal support for one of the factors that he felt must be
present if the waging of a war was to be justified.

He

clearly felt that for a war to be just it must be undertaken
under an appropriate authority.
Thomas continued.

Second, a juat cause is required, namely that those
who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve
it on account of some fault.

Here Thomas makes it quite clear that there must be a just

cause for going to war.

While he does not go into the

detail one finds in other authors, it may be assumed that,

being cognizant of the writings of his predecessors, he felt
that this point had been adequately diacuaaed.
Thomas concluded his answer, writing,

45ibid.

46ibid.
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Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents
should have a rightful intention, so that they intend
the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. . .

For it may happen that the war is declared by the

legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be
rendered unlawful through a wicked intention

Thomas expanded on the idea he expressed here in his reply
to the third objection, writing, "Those who wage war justly

aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except
to the evil peace.

In summary, we can see that Thomas taught that for

participation in a war as a combatant to be justified, the
war must be under the auspices of the sovereign, it must

have been begun for a justifiable cause, and it must be
waged with a rightful intention, namely that a good peace
may ensue.

All of this seems quite clear and straightforward,
and it would seem that we can claim that Thomas taught a

simple, pure just war theory.

This would be true were it

not for other political writings of Thomas that must be
examined in this regard.

In one of these writings, Thomas

deals with the question we have yet to investigate, namely
the question of what relationship Thomas saw to exist be
tween the pope and the sovereign.
There is no difficulty in determining Thomas's

thinking on this subject.

47ibid.

We read in De Reqno.

48ibid.
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Thua^ in order bhat. apirit.uai t.hinga might, be dia-binguiahed from earthly bhinga, the mini8t.ry of this
kingdom Ci.e., the church! haa been entruated not to
earthly kinga but to prieata, and moat of all to the
chief prieaty the aucceaaor of St. Peter, the Vicar of
Chriat, the Roman Pontiff. To him all the kinga of the
Chriatian People are to be aub3ect aa to our Lord Jeaua
Chriat Himself

If thia ia not clear enough Thomaa haa provided ua

with an expoaition of the logic underlying thia view and
thereby alao underlying hia teaching concerning the absolute
supremacy of the pope.

He wrote.

Because the priesthood of the gentiles and the
whole worship of their goda existed merely for the ac
quisition of temporal goods (which were all ordained to
the common good of the multitude, whose care devolved
upon the king), the priests of the gentiles were prop
erly subject to the kinga. Similarly, since in the old
law earthly goods were promised to the religious people

(not indeed by demons but by the true God), the priests
of the old law, we read, were also subject to the kings.
But in the new law, there is a higher priesthood by

which men are guided to heavenly goods. Consequently,
in the law of Christ, kings must be subject to priests
Here again we meet a just law theory that ia prone to

Blip from the idea of a just war to that of a crusade.

It

is not at all difficult to imagine what would have happened

were the pope to have told the sovereign to commence hostil
ities against an enemy of the church.

It is not at all

difficult to imagine for this is, in fact, precisely what
did happen to begin the crusades.
However, we must not think that this particular

'^^horaas Aquinas, De Regno, 110.
^^homas Aquinas, De Regno. 111.
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problem ia a problem that, poaaeaaea merely hiatorlcal aignificance.

Churchmen of the twentieth centry reaemble their

predeceaaora of the medieval era in a number of waya.

One

of theae waya ia the weaknesa both have had for apeaking

concerning mattera that are not the appropriate concern of
the church.

Cruaadea did not ceaae with the cloae of the

medieval era.

The

Cruaade

Aa noted above, the idea of the crusade comes about

when the organized church takes a directing role in the

waging of a war.

No longer is participation in the war

merely permitted or encouraged.

It ia now actively aided

and abetted by the church, and the church also takes an
active role in attempting to determine the grand strategy
to be followed in waging the war.
If we are to deal fairly with the idea of the cruaade
as well as with those who first put the idea forward in the

middle ages, we must bear in mind some of the problems in
the troubled history of that period.
With the beginning of the decline of the empire and
the onset of the barbarian invasions, medieval man was

compelled more and more to look to his own resources.

With

the Hun in the next village and the smoke of hia fires

flavoring the air, one probably would not be inclined to
send an emissary to distant Rome to inquire if she could
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turn from her other distractions long enough to send several

powerful legions to assist in the fight.

The vastness of

her frontiers that had once been one of her sources of

strength now was the source of one of Rome's weaknesses, for
now her forces were spread so thinly that she could seldom
muster sufficient force anywhere in the empire.
If the Hun was in the next village, one was faced

with a situation he was compelled to handle using only

locally available resources.

Thus was feudalism born, and

thus did it flourish.

Under such emergency conditions, hierarchical organ
izations tended to disintegrate or, at best, to be honored
in name alone.

The stalwart few defending a minor castle

often held out better prospects for safety than those

allegedly mighty legions of Rome beyond the Alps.
As order and organization was again gradually re

stored in Europe, it was an order quite different from that
which had disintegrated under the assaults of the barbarians.
While it can be said that the Roman empire never disappeared

during this period, the men who now claimed the crown were
barbarians, and their administration, while avowedly Roman
and a conscious imitation of the empire of old, contained

many practices that were barbarian in origin.
That being the case, as we study the rise of the cru
sade we do well to remember that the western world then did

not have the sharply deliniated government that we see
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today.

The organized church of weatern Europe of the tenth

through fourteenth centuries was not the anooth organization
the Roman church la today.

Neither organization then ex

isted In the sharply-drawn distinction over against the
other that Is the case today.

The western European who had

time to ponder such things did not see the constituency of
the prince.

Both prince and bishop served and ruled one

single people, for virtually everyone—Jews and heretics

excepted—was a member of the church.

Thus, when the people

went to war, the church went to war, for the people were the
church.

It Is In this fact that we find the roots of the

practice still followed In Great Britain and In Canada of
the battle standards of various combat organizations being

kept In the cathedral of the see where the organization was
raised.

Into this amorphous and often chaotic situation came

the teaching of Augustine that, as we have seen, failed to

provide the theoretical basis for a sharp boundary separ
ating the 3uat war Idea from the Idea of a crusade.

If we

keep all of this In mind, we shall not be at all surprised
to find that the crusade Idea grew vigorously In this cli
mate.

The crusade Idea takes Its name from the crusade move
ment of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

In 1094, Em

peror Alexius Comnenus of the Byzantines sent envoys to a
council of the Roman church being held at Placenza.

These
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envoys urgently request.ed niilit.ary aid £rom t.he west, to
assist them in their struggle against the Turks.

It was

also pointed out at that time to Pope Urban II that the in
roads of the Turks threatened not only the Byzantines but
also the Europeans.

Apparently, at first. Urban intended to send only a
small expeditionary force in order to assure Alexis of his
good will and to examine the situation, as well as to aid in

the battle against the Turk.

However, as time went by.

Urban'a evaluation of the appropriate response in this situ

ation altered drastically.

By November 1095, Urban had a

far grander intervention in mind than dispatching of a small
group of knights, and he hestiated no longer in making his
views known.

Speaking in his native French to a synod of

the church at Clermont to a congregation composed primarily
of Frenchmen, Urban said,

O race of Franks, we learn that in some of your

provinces no one can venture on the road by day or by
night without injury or attack by highwaymen, and no one
is secure even at home.

Let us then re-enact the law of

our ancestors known as the Truce of God.

And now that

you are obligated to succour your brethren in the East,
menaced by an accursed race, utterly alienated from God.
The Holy Sepulchre of our Lord is polluted by the filthiness of an unclean nation.

Charlemagne.

Recall the greatness of

O most valient soldiers, descendants of

invincible ancestors, do not be degenerate.

Let all

hatred depart from among you, all quarrels end, all wars
cease. Start upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre to

^^Marshall W. Baldwin, The Medieval Church (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press), p. 100.
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wrest that land from the wicked race and subject it to
youraelvea.
Connected with this call to arms was the announcement of a

plenary indulgence for all who heeded the call and went on
the crusade.

In Urban's speech we see examples of several key
characteristics that serve to differentiate a crusade from a

3uat war.

First, under the crusade idea, the church at

tempts to instigate the war as opposed to merely approving
limited participation in it.

Second, the church assumes a

role of command insofar as the conduct of the war is con

cerned.

Third, the enemy is described as being damned.

Fourth, the war is described as the will of God.

Fifth,

the war is fought to gain some advantage for the church as

opposed to a purely political advantage for the government
involved.

Sixth, those who take up arms and participate are

promised some spiritual blessing or advantage.
Of course not all of these marks have been clearly

evident in every proposal for a crusade.

However, when

these marks are evident, they serve as evidence that the

organized church, or a portion of it, has stepped over the
boundary between the kingdom of the right hand and the

52urban II, speech at the Council of Clermont, 1095,
in Roland Bainton, ed.. The Medieval Church (Princeton, NJ:
D. van Nostrand and Co., 1962>, p. lid.
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kingdom of -the lef-t and la engaged in an attemp-t to aaaume

authority In that kingdom of compulalon and law.

That, of

courae, la never the taak of the church qua church.

CHAPTER IX

THE JUST WAR TEACHING OF
MARTIN LUTHER

Martin Luther underetood^ on the basis of Scripture,^
that the institution of civil government is established by
God.

He wrote.

We do not owe the government obedience for its own

sake, says St. Peter, but for the sake of God, whose
children we are.

This must induce us to be obedient

not the thought that our obedience is a meritorious
deed.^
Luther held that this obedience owed to the civil gov

ernment included military service.

In regard to this par

ticular type of obedience to government he wrote.
Thus, when the government, by virtue of its office,
calls citizens into military service in order to main

tain peace and ward off harm, obedience is shown to God.
For the Lord tells us (Rom. 13:1>: "Let every person be

subject to the governing authorities."3
However, Luther was by no means naive concerning the
nature and results of warfare.

Well aware of the terrible

price exacted by armed conflict, Luther wrote, "It is a
known fact also that wars at the present time are of such a

^E.g., Romans 13:1-7; 1 Peter 2:13-17.
^Martin Luther, Sermons on the First Epistle of
St. Peter. in the American Edition of Luther*s Works. 55

vols., ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis:
Concordia Publishing House and Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1955- >, 30:74. Hereafter referred to as "LW,."

^Luther, Lectures on Genesis. LW, 2:272.
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charact.er as to make former wars appear as mere child's

play.4
Luther set forth a ^ust war theory that represents an

important development of the theory held by his predeces
sors.

While there seems to have been differences of opinion

In medieval times concerning whether the participation of
both sides In a war could be justified^ there la no such
confusion In Luther's writings.

Insofar as he was con

cerned, at least one party to the conflict must be In the

wrong and their participation thereby unjustifiable.

That

being the case, Luther wrote.
Because the whole world Is engrossed In ambition

and Is profoundly wise,
jealousies, dissensions
Even though you do what
right, yet peace cannot

there Is no place for love;
and wars abound everywhere.
Abram did for Lot and yield your
be maintained, not even If you

bear wrongs and disregard them.^
He added.

And this Is the reason why Moses gives such a care

ful description of this war, namely that we may see the
reign of the devil and of reason. God wants governments
to exist; He wants evildoers to be condemned and the
godly defended. But Satan corrupts the hearts so that
the authorities degenerate Into tyrants.

Then follows

wars and uprisings, the punishment of sins.

These

'^Martin Luther, "Sermon on the Gospel for the Second
Sunday In Advent," In John Nicholas Lenker, ed.. Sermons of
Martin Luther (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), p. 74.
See also Luther's Lectures on Genesis. LW. 2:142 and 368-

69; Lectures on Isaiah. LW. 16:134 and 284; Sermons on
the Gospel of St, John. LW, 24:14 and 315; "Whether Sol

diers, Too, Can Be Saved," LW. 46:78 and 96; and "Ten Sermons
on the Catechism," LW. 51:175.

^Luther, Lectures on Genesis. LW. 2:338.
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affect, the godly too, aa we ahall hear now about Lot.
But the Lord knows how to rescue the righteous man in

the evil day.^
Luther's concept of the two kingdoms, each governed
by its appropriate rule, enabled him to avoid the blurring
of his 3uat war theory into the idea of a crusade.

Inasmuch

aa the kingdom of the right hand is ruled by love, it is
entirely inappropriate that it should wield the sword.
Luther wrote.

If the banner of Emperor Charles or a prince is in
the field, then let everyone run boldly and gladly to
the banner to which his allegiance is sworn. . . . But
if the banner of a bishop, cardinal, or pope is there,

then run the other way.^
In fact, when the Emperor threatened to destroy the
Lutheran church by force of arms, Luther wrote that the
Lutheran princes even then did not have a 3ust cause to wage
a war of rebellion against their lord, the Emperor, in de
fense of the true faith.

In the place of armed resistance,

Luther recommended.

One should proceed aa follows: If His Imperial Ma3esty proceeds against us then no sovereign or lord is to
protect us against His 11a3esty; rather, he is to leave
territory and people standing open to the Emperor, as
belonging to him, and commend the matter to God. No one
is to ask his sovereign or lord to do otherwise. But
everyone is then to stand for himself and confess his

faith by offering his body and life, and not to drag the
sovereign into danger or burden him by seeking protec
tion; rather he should let the Emperor deal with his

^Luther, Lectures on Genesis. LW, 2:369.

^Martin Luther, "Admonition to Peace, A Reply to the
Twelve Articles of the Peasants in Swabia," LW. 46:17-43.

134

sub3ect.s as the Emperor wishes, as long as he is

Emperor.®
We would do well to make careful note of the line of

argument in this letter, inasmuch as Luther did subsequently
agree that the princes could justifiably wage war against

the Emperor.

The question to which Luther here addressed

himself was the question of whether the princes and electors
should fight against the Emperor in the case that the

Emperor sought to proceed against the Lutherans in their
lands by force and violence.

Luther says that war in this

case is unjustifiable, for the princes^ subjects are also

the Emperor'"s subjects, and the Emperor is not answerable to
his subordinates for his conduct toward his own subjects.

Later that same year, Luther wrote again, this time

stating that the princes and electors could justifiably wage
a war of rebellion against the Emperor should the Emperor

move against the Lutherans by force.

In a letter he himself

delivered to the councilors of Saxony,^ Luther wrote,
A piece of paper has been presented to us from which
we see what the Doctors of Law are concluding regarding

the question: In what situations may one resist the

governing authority?

If, then, Cthis issue] has been

and Csince] we certainly are in those situations in
which <as Cthe legal experts! demonstrate) one may re
sist the governing authority, and Csince] we have always

taught that as long as the gospel does not go contrary
to secular law one is to let secular law be effective,

valid, and competent Cin those matters it is able to

®Martin Luther to Elector John of Wittenberg, 6 March
1530, LW, 49:278.

^LW, 49:429.
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handle!], we therefore are unable to oppose [anyone with

arguroents taken front!] Scripture, if in this instance it
is necessary to fight back, even if the Emperor himself

[attacks us3, or whoever else moy do so in his name.^*^
Luther concluded this letter.

That until now we have taught absolutely not to

resist the governing authority was due to the fact that
we did not know that the governing authority's law it

self grants [the right of armed resistance!; we have,
of course, always diligently taught the Cthia3 law must
be obeyed.

Legal experts had prepared a brief concerning what we
would call constitutional law and had presented this brief

to the Wittenberg theologians.

The brief argued that the

actions of the Emperor in religious matters were circum

scribed by writs handed down by a general council.

Thus, by

the law of the empire, the Emperor was forbidden to begin a

religious war against anyone without the approval of a coun
cil.

The Lutherans had appealed to a council in regard to

their being allowed to worship as their consciences dic
tated.

No council had yet decided against them.

Therefore,

for Charles to move against them by force would be to vio
late the very laws by which he held his office.
There is no small amount of debate concerning whether

this argument validly reflects the constitutional theory of
the Holy Roman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth

century.

Be that as it may, what is important for our

^^Martin Luther to the Electoral Saxony Government,
about 27 October 1530, in LW. 49:432.

lllbid.
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purposes Is t.hat Lutiher thought, that, it did.

That being the

case, Luther could hold that a war against the Emperor would
rather be a war waged against a tyranical agressor.

In this

case, the princes would be fighting in support of the empire
against a rebel Emperor.
This evaluation disagrees somewhat with the evaluation
of Lowell Green who writes that Luther

had conceded the right to resist solely on the basis of
the legal code, but that in his opinion resistance still
lacked support from the theological point of view. The
princes could still resist only as membra corporis politici and

not as membra corooris Chriati et corporis

ecclesiastici CChriatiane and churchmen).^2
In fact, the brief moved the entire argument into a dif
ferent arena.

Previously, the argument concerned whether a

Christian, qua Christian, had the right to resist his duly
ordained civil ruler.

Luther's answer to this question was

and remained an unqualified "No.**

The brief, however,

shifted discussion of resistance to the Emperor from a dis

cussion of this question to discussion of the question, **May

the princes and electors wage war on the Emperor in defense
of the Empire?*'

It is to this question that Luther gives a

"yes.**

As Green points out, this was not the last time Luther
felt called upon to discuss the question of resistance to
authority.

Green writes.

^^Lowell Green, ''Resistance to Authority and Luther,
The Lutheran QuarterIv 6 (November 1954):345.
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. . . Lut,her, together with Justus Jonas and Martin
Bucer, signed a atatenent prepared by Melanchton to the
effect that the German electors and princes were in duty
bound to arm themselves that they might protect their

subjects in the event that the higher authority should
attempt to compel them to return to "idolatry and for
bidden divine worship." Just as a father is obligated
to protect his family from murder, so were the princes

bound to protect their citizens even if Charles V should
march against them with arras, for murder is murder, even
when committed by an unjust emperor

Here again we are looking at a subtly different situ
ation from one of simple rebellion against constituted civil
authority.

In this case, the pope had directed the Emperor

to wage a war of extermination against the Lutherans.

Thus

the pope would be the supreme commander in this contemplated
war.

Luther denied the pope civil authority over German

territory.

Therefore, one could justifiably, and should,

resist an attack instigated by the pope against their lands
and peoples.
Here we see clearly that Luther would have nothing to
do with a crusade.

When what would in effect have been a

crusade was urged in defense of the Lutherans, Luther forbad
it.

When one was urged against the Lutherans, Luther en

couraged resistance to it.

Luther was able to make this

sharply drawn distinction because of his clear idea of the
two kingdoms and of the rules applicable in each.
Luther held that for participation in a war to be jus

tifiable that pariticpation must be under the auspices of

ISQroen, "Resistance," p. 345.
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someone who had the authority to wage war, that is, the

supreme civil authority.

The pope ia not a civil authority.

Therefore, a war waged under his command could not be just.
Similarly, a war waged solely at the instigation of the
church could not be just either.

It is important to note at this point that John Calvin
differs from Luther.

Where Luther taught that it was the

chief duty of the civil ruler to preserve the peace, Calvin
had another idea.

He wrote.

The duty of magistrates, its nature, as described by
the word of God, and the things in which it consists, I
will here indicate in passing. That it extends to both
tables of the law, did Scripture not teach, we might

learn from profane writers; for no man has discoursed of
the duty of magistrates, the enacting of laws, and the
common weal, without beginning with religion and divine

worship. Thus all have confessed that no polity can be
successfully established unless piety be its first care,
and that those laws are absurd which disregard the

rights of God, and consult only for men. Seeing then
that among philosophers religion holds the first place,
and that the same thing has always been observed with
the universal consent of nations, Christian princes and

magistrates may be ashamed of their heartlessnesa if

they make it not their care.^*^
For Calvin, the chief duty of the state ia to ensure that

God be worshipped aright.

That being the case, it ia in

cluded among the duties of the state that it protect the
church against her foes.
Here again we have a flaw in theory that allows the

possibility of a crusade.

If the state exists to support

i'^John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion,
trans. Henry Eeveridge (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub
lishing Co., 1964>, book IV, chap. 20, sec. 9.
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the church, then certainly the church ia the beat judge o£
when that aupport ia needed.

Thua the church nay tell the

atate that a war ia neceaaary and nay further direct how
that war ia to be carried out.

When the church

directa the

civil govrnment concerning the waging of a war, the war ia
a cruaade.

Luther alao held that in order for participation in

a war to be juatifiable there muat be a juat cauae.

He

wrote.

No war ia juat, even if it ia a war between equala,
unleaa one haa auch a good reaaon for fighting and auch

a good conacience that he can aay, "My neighbor conpela
and forcea me to fight, though I would rather avoid

it.15
Inaofar aa Luther waa concerned, the cauae for going
to war needed to be more than merely juat.

It muat alao be

aufficiently grave ao that the condition of the prince^a
realm after the war ia fought will be better than had no war
been fought at all.

Luther wrote.

Therefore, right or wrong ia never a aufficient
cauae indiacriminently to puniah or make war. It ia a
aufficient cauae to puniah within bounda and without
deatroying the other. The lord or ruler muat alwaya
look to what will profit the whole maaa of hia aubjecta
rather than any one portion. That houaeholder will
never grow rich who, becauae aomeone haa plucked a

15Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," LW.
46:121.

See alao, Luther, Lectures on Deuteronomv. LW,

9:232; Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount. LW, 21:39;
"Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed," LW.
45:124; "Trade and Usury," LW 45:279.
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feather from hia gooae, flings the whole goose after
him.

Luther felt that a ruler's cause was not 3ust unless

he had first exhausted all peaceful means of resolving the
dispute before beginning a war.

He wrote^

Still it is not right for a prince to make up his

mind to go to war against his neighbor, even though, I
say, he has a just cause and his neighbor is in the
wrong. The command is: "Blessed are the peacemakers."
Therefore anyone who claims to be a Christian and a
child of God, not only does not start war or unrest; but
also he gives help and counsel on the side of peace
wherever he can, even though there may have been a just
and adequate cause for going to war. It is sad enough
if one has tried everything and nothing helps, and then
he has to defend himself, to protect his land and

people.

Therefore not "Christiana" but "children of the

devil" is the name of those quarrelsome young noblemen

who immediately draw and unsheathe their sword on

account of one word.^^
Luther was also concerned that a war be conducted

using only justifiable means.

In his commentary on Deuter~

onomy he cited God's rule that Israel was to use no fruit
trees in their aiegeworks.

Then he wrote.

He CGod3 wants this people to be civil and not bar

barous, and to wage war, not to devastate a land which
has not sinned but to sweep away the godless. He stirs
their sensibility and feeling of civility beautifully
when He says <v. 9): "Because it is wood, and not a man,
it cannot harm you." Nevertheless, because they are
wild men and almost beasts, armies despoil everything
with sword and fire. Certainly He who wanted a nation
so self-controlled that they would spare trees never

would have permitted them to rage against women and

l^Luther, Commentary on the Magnificat. LW.,
21:33a.

^^Luther, Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount.
LW, 21:40.
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girls in debauchery, lust., and other violence after con
quering the enemy, as it happens nowadays in our barbar
ity.
We can see that Luther

was aware that those

who were

authorized by their office to wage war often did so using

unjustifiable means.

Thus he wrote.

There are some who abuse this office

Cof soldier]

and strike and kill people needlessly, simply because
they want to. But that is the fault of the persona, not
of the office, for where is there an office or a work or

anything else so good that self-willed, wicked people do
not abuse it? They are like mad physicians who would
needlessly amputate a healthy hand just because they
wanted to. Indeed, they themselves are a part of that
universal lack of peace which must be prevented by just
wars and the sword and forced into peace. It always
happens and always has happened that those who begin war
unnecessarily are beaten. Ultimately, they cannot es
cape God's judgment and sword. In the end God's justice
finds them and strikes, as happened to the peasants in
the revolt.

Luther concluded, ". . . the abuse does not affect the

office."20
In his teaching concerning the just war, Luther fol
lowed the medieval precedent of requiring an appropriate

authority, just cause, and just means.

He clarified the

teaching by pointing out that only one side in the war could
be said to be waging a just war.

For our purposes, it may

be well to note that he also taught that wars occurred in

which the participation of neither aide was justifiable.

l^Luther, Lectures on Deuteronomy. LW. 9:204.

^^Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," LW.
46:97.

20ibid.
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Luther also wrote concerning the case where the sub

ject is required to fight in an unjust war.

In this case

the subject must disobey the command of his prince for "it
is no one's duty to do wrong; we must obey God (who desires

the right) rather than men. . . ."21

However, the subject

must be certain that the war is unjust.

In the case where

the subject is uncertain and is unable to obtain sufficient
information to make an informed decision, he is to fight for

his prince and he may do so with a clear conscience.22
However, Luther's moat valuable contribution to just

war theory lies not in his clarifying of certain blurred
medieval distinctions but in his establishing clear bounds

for the duty and the authority of the civil magistrate so
that one who followed his theory could clearly distinguish
between the just war and the crusade.
The Lutheran Confessions say little concerning the
nature and content of the just war theory.
ever, endorse it.

They do, how

Thus, we read in the Augsburg Confession,

Of Civil Affairs they Cthe Lutheran theologians^
teach that lawful civil ordinances are good works of God
and that it is right for Christians to bear civil of
fice, to sit as judges, to judge matters by the Imperial
and other existing laws, to award just punishments, to
engage in just wars, to serve as soldiers, to make legal
contracts, to hold property, to make oath when required
by the magistrates, to marry a wife, to be given in mar
riage.

2lLuther, "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It
Should Be Obeyed," LW. 45:125.

22ibid., p. 126.
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They condemn t.he Anabaptle-ta who £orbid -theae civil

offices to the Christian-23
In diacuaaing the appropriate remembrance of the
aainta, the Auguatana again mentiona the conduct of warfare.
Here, it la intereating that the confeaaion implicitly rejecta the crusade idea, stating
Of the Worship of Sainta they teach that the
memory of the sainta may be set before us, that we may
follow their faith and good works, according to our

calling, as the Emperor may follow the example of David
in making war to drive away the Turk from his country.

For both are kings.24
What is of interest here for our purposes is the

reason given for the Emperor to emulate David and drive the
Turka from the Empire.

"For both are kings," we are told.

No mention is made of the heathen character of the worship

of the Turka or of the need of the true faith to be pro
tected from the infidel.

It ia the country (oatria) that

ia to be defended, not the church.

The waging of war ia mentioned in the Apology of the
Augsburg Confeaaion in connection with the controversy con
cerning what was accounted to be a good work in the sight of
God.

The confeaaion states

David's labors, in waging wars and in his home govern

ment, are holy works, are true sacrifices, are contests
of God, defending the people who had the Word of God

23Tho Augsburg Confession, Art. XVI, pars. 1, 2.
24The Augsburg Confession, Art. XXI, par. 1.
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againat -the devil in order -that -the knowledge of God

might not bo entirely extinguished on earth.25
Once more the idea involved here, as can be seen from the

context,26 ig that David served God not by taking on some
apecial and extraordinary task but by fulfilling the duties
of the office to which God had called him, the office of the

king of Israel, the magistrate responsible for the military
defense of the

nation.

The Apology further upholds the teaching of the just
war when it mentions war as a form of public redress com

manded by God.27

Implicit in this statement is the idea

that a war is not to be begun without a just cause.

A reading of the Luthran Confessions shows that the
just war concept was generally accepted by both the Luth

erans and their opponents.

Therefore, we find few state

ments explaining or clarifying the theory, for it was not

a point of contention.

What was a point of difference was

that between the Anabaptists and the Lutherans, mentioned in

the Augsburg Confession.

Here the Anabaptists did not argue

with the Lutherans concerning the appropriate form for a
just war theory.

The Anabaptists were pacifists and denied

25The Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. Ill,
par. 70.

26see, for example, pors. 71 and 72.

277he Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. XVI,
par. 59.
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the Christian any legitimate participation in any sort o£
warfare.
error.

The Lutherans, of course, spoke out against this

CHAPTER

X

LUTHER'S JUST WAR TEACHING AS REFLECTED
IN THE THOUGHT OF LUTHERAN ORTHODOXY

The theology of the era of Lutheran orthodoxy is only

now beginning to emerge from a half century of eclipse in
the shadow of monumental unfounded and un3uat criticism.

It

is still fashionable in some circles to speak of "dead or

thodoxy," but in recent times more attention is being given

to such theologians as Martin Chemnitz and John Gerhard,
with the result that the true worth of their thinking is

again being realized.
The theologians of this era have been described as

being out of touch with the needs of the Christian lay

person.^

However, a more accurate evaluation is that given

by Bengt Hagglund who writes.

With respect to its versatile comprehension of theogical material and the breadth of its knowledge of the
Bible, Lutheran orthodoxy marks the high point in the
entire history of theology. And it was not only contem

porary tradition or the next preceding tradition which
provided the material for the great Lutheran doctrinal
expositions of the 17th century, but to an even greater

extent it was the Bible and patristic sources.^
^Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard <St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), p. 79.

^Bengt Hiigglund, History of Theology, trans. Gene J.
Lund (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 196d>, p. 303.
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The barrier between thia work and the modern theologian is,

in moat caaea, the Latin language.

With the work of trana-

latora proceeding apace, this barrier ia being in part
surmounted.

However, even a modest knowledge of Latin opens

this vast atorehouae to today's theologian.

It ia generally reckoned that the era of classical
Lutheran orthodoxy can be said to have extended from about
15S0 to about 1720.

There is no doubt that the orthodox

Lutheran theologians of this period taught a 3uat war theory.

Martin Chemnitz,^ Leonard Butter,^ John Gerhard,^
Abraham Calov,^ John Adam Scherzer,^ John Andrew Quenstedt® John William Baier,^ Frederick Bechmann,^^ John

^Martin Chemnitz, Locorum Theologicorum (Wittenberg:
Impenaia dementia Bergeri & Zachariae Schureni Bibliopolarum,
1615>, Part II, pp. 126-29.

'^Leonard Butter, Loci Communes Theologici (Witten
berg: Typia & Impenaia Jobi Wilhelmi Fincelii & Johannia
Seelfiachii, 1661>, pp. 960-61.

Sjohn Gerhard, Locorum Theologicorum 22 vols.
(Tubingen: Sumtibua Jo. Georgii Cottae, 1776), 14:23S-30S.

^Abraham Calov, Svstematis Locorum Theologicorum
(Wittenberg: Excudebat Johannea Wilkius, 1677), pp. 176-dO.

^John Adam Scherzer, Svstema Theologiae. XXX Pefinitionibua Abaolutum (Leipzig & Frankfurt: Sumptibua Joh.
Christoph. Tarnovi, 1601), p. 734.

®John Adam Quenstedt, Theologia Didactio-Polemica
(Wittenberg: Mattaei Henckelii, 1685), Part IV, pp. 429-32.

^John William Baier, Compendium Theologiae Positivae
3 vola. (St. Louis: Luth. Concordia-Verlag., 1873), 3:739.

^^Frederick Bechmann, Annotationes Uberiores in
Compendium Theoloaicum Leonardi Butteri (Frankfurt & Leipzip:
Sumtibus Benrici Christophori Crokeri Bibliopol, 1703), pp. 908-12

I4d

George Welch,

John Benedict, Cerpzov,^^

Devid

Hollez^^ ell wrote in favor of the ^uet war teaching.
The statements of these theologians concerning the

just war differed with the tinea and with the purpose of

their writing-

Thus while Walch^"^ and Carpzov^^ merely

say that the position taken by the Lutherans in their con
fessions permits Christians to take part in just wars,
others, such as John Gerhard, provide an extended exami

nation of the teaching concerning the just war as well as
responses to some of the objections that have been raised
against the teaching.

Basically, the teaching of the just war espoused by
the theologians of Lutheran orthodoxy established three con
ditions that must be fulfilled before participation in a war

could be considered just.

These were the same three condi

tions that had been established by Martin Luther, namely,
that the war must be undertaken under the command of an

Hjohn George Walch, Introductio in Libros Ecclesioe
Lutheranae Symbolicoa (Jena: Sumtu V/idvae Meyer, 1732), p.
896.

12john Benedict Carpzov, Isagoeie in Libros
Eccleaiaruro Lutheranarum Symbolicoa (Leipzig: Impensis
Davidis Fleiaheri, 1699), p. 463.

13David Hollaz, Examinis Theologici Acromatici 3
vols. (Rostock & Leipzig: Johann Heinr.

Rusawormium, Bibl.,

1725), 2:890-91.

^^John Walch, Introductio- p. 896.

^^John Carpzov, Isagoge. p. 463.
^^John Gerhard, Locorum. 14:238-305.
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appropriat.e aut.horl-ty^ that It muat have a ^uat cauae^i and

that it muat be waged in a juat manner.

Of courae theae

theologiana expreaaed thia teaching in different waya and
in different contexta.

Some eatabliahed

more than three

conditiona;, but when their Xiata are examined carefully it
can be aeen that their teaching could aa well be encompaaaed
in the three conditiona mentioned.

Aa an example, we read in Quenatedt,
Diating. inter bellum juatum et legitimum, et quod
non niai urgente necesaitate auacipitur; et bellum
injuatum, illegitimura, et quod nullara urgente
neceaaitate vicino alicui Prinipi movetur, non de hoc,
aed illo aerroo eat.

Illud autem

bellum cenaetur naturam

licitum et juatum in quo hae trea adaunt conditionea;
1. Legitima autoritaa indlcendi bellum, 2. Juata cauaa,
3. Recta intentio. Ut ita legitimum bellum aet ac

juatum, quod a legitimo Magiatratu 3uatia de cauaia ad
pacem Reipubl. auaceptam, cum juatitiam et aequitate,
adhibitom omni moderotione adminiatratur.

It muat be underatood that the general outline of

thia 3uat war theory waa widely held in the aeventeenth cen
tury.

Hugo Grotiua, the Dutch 3uriat conaidered to be the

father of modern international law, completed hia claaaic.
The Riahta of War and Peace, in 1625.

A brief reflection

on the hiatory of that period will give one a correct eatimate of the importance of Grotiua''a work.

The medieval

order of international law aupported at leaat in part by a
univeraal Roman church had now collapaed.

The need for a

new ayatem to eatabliah aome limita to the brutality of war

^"^Quenstedt, Theologia. p. 429.
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was being demona-trated by the campaigns of the Thirty Years
War, even as Grotius wrote.

Grotius is generally considered to have established
six criteria for determining whether or not a given war is
just.

These criteria were:

1.

The resulting condition after the war should be

better than had no war been fought.^®
2.

The war should be made by the sovereign power of

the state involved.

3.

The war must be accompanied by the prerequisite

formalities such as a declaration that a state of war

exists between the states involved.20
4.

The war must be motivated by a just cause, as,

for example, self defense, indemnity, or punishment for

a serious wrong committed by the other state.21
5.

All peaceful means of settlement must be ex

hausted before hostilities are begun.22
6.

The war must be fought using just means, in

cluding but not limited to the protection of the rights of
non-combatants and the observation of good faith with the

^^Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (Wash
ington, D.C.: M. Walter Dunne, 1901>, pp. 17, 281.

^^Grotius, War. pp. 57, 60, 321.
20ibid., pp. 57, 317.
21lbid., pp. 75, 77-80, 229-30, 268-70.
22ibid., pp. 276, 280, 318.
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enemy In mat.t.era such as -trucea, aafe-conducta, and the

like.23
A brief examination of Grotiua'a aix pointa will re

veal that they are aimply an expanaion and explanation of
the three pointa that were uaed by Lutheran theologiana in

their expoaition of the juat war theory.

Pointa two, four,

and aix are explicit atatementa of the three pointa held by
the Lutheran theologiana.

Point one haa already been men

tioned in the prevloua chapter aa an indicator of whether
there ia a juat and aufficient cauae for going to war.
Pointa three and five concern themaelvea with what conduct

ia appropriate and acceptable between combatanta in war and
might juatifiably be aubaumed under the rule that for a war

to be juat it muat be fought uaing juatifiable meana.
Grotiua wrote The Riohta of War and Peace aa a juriat,

although he alao on occasion wrote theological works of a

distinctly Arminian flavor-

Thus The Rights of War and Peace

deals more with the practical and the legal issues arising
from warfare.

Grotiua went into greater detail than the

Lutheran theologiana in describing what conduct was allowed
and what was prohibited in the waging of a juat war.

He

went to some pains to describe in detail those who should
not be made the victims of war, auch aa women, children.

23ibid-, pp. 292-93, 302-304, 311-14, 333, 337, 353,
360-62, 364, 366, 381, 385, 403.
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noncombatont, men, prleonere* and neubrale

He wae careful

t.o delineate bhoae cauaea t.hat. were ^uat. <ael£-de£enae,

indemnity, and puniahment) and thoae that were unjuat <reaentment, £ear o£ impending agreaaion on the part o£ the
adveraary, mere apprehension, covetousneaa, and the deaire
to enslave).

He also set forth requirements concerning

the manner in which a war could be waged ao as to result in

the least amount o£ damage and hardship, thereby expanding

on the idea that a just war is fought in a just manner.26
The juat war theory o£ the Lutheran orthodox theolo

gians benefitted from the sharply delineated concept of the
office of the civil magistrate that they had received from
Luther.

With Luther, they understood that the civil author

ity dealt with the external actions of man and not with
spiritual matters.

Thua, Gerhard could write.

Through the political magistrate, CGod3 preserves
peace and outward tranquility, administers civil jus

tice, and protects our property, reputation, and per
sons.27
It is true that the orthodox Lutheran theologians

spoke of the civil government as being instituted for the

24ibid., pp. 326, 337, 353, 361-62.
25ibid., pp. 77-79, 81-82, 229-30.
26lbid., pp. 292-93.
27Gerhard, Locorum■ 13:226, quoted in Heinrich
Schmid, The Doctrinal Theoloov of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church. trans. Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs (Minneap
olis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 617.
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welfare of the Christian church, but we need only to examine

what they have written in this regard to see the distinction
between their view and that of John Calvin and those who

followed his thinking in this regard.

Thus, for example,

Gerhard wrote.

The magistracy has been established by God, no less
than the Cpastorall ministry, for the collection, pres
ervation and extension of the Church, inasmuch as by

means of it both outward discipline and public peace and

tranquility are preserved, without which the ministry of
the Church could not readily perform its duty, and the
collection and extension of the Church could scarcely

have o ploce, 1 Tim. 2:2.28
The Lutheran theologians did not believe that the

civil government existed for the direct preservation and

protection of the organizational church.

As Gerhard has

written, the duty of the civil government was to protect

and promote the public peace.

By simple definition, the

public peace was a peace involving the entire public, not
merely the church.

The Lutheran theologians believed that

when the civil government promoted the public peace, the
Church was able to get on with her task.

Thus the Lutherans

did not believe that it was the task of the magistrate to

take the church''s part against her enemies.

They expected

him merely to promote peace, order, and good government.

He

was not to fight wars on behalf of the church, but he was to
defend the entire nation, church and heathen alike, when

justice so demanded.

28Gerhard, Locorum. 13:225, quoted in Schmid,
Theology■

p.

618.

CHAPTER

XI

CONCLUSIONS

Lutherans from the time of Luther to the present have

concerned themselves with the question of how the believing
child of God is to conduct himself in this sinful world.

As

a part of this larger problem, Lutherans have dealt with the
issue of whether and under what conditions a Christian may

take the part of a combatant in warfare.
The literature of the first century and a half of

Lutheranism is surprisingly unanimous in its opinion on this

subject.

Luther and the Lutheran theologians of the era of

Lutheran orthodoxy taught that the Christian citizen is com

manded by God to be an obedient subject except when the
civil ruler commanded disobedience to God.

This obedience

to the civil ruler includes serving as a combatant in just

wars.

Only in the case where the citizen knows the war to

be unjust is he excused from participation in the war.

In

the research conducted for this thesis, no Lutheran theo

logian was discovered who taught other than a just war
theory.

The just war teaching propounded by the Lutheran theo
logians is very similar to that propounded by other scholars
In particular, it is similar to that proposed by the great
154

155

aevent.eent.h century jurist, Hugo Grotius.

However, the

Lutherans had an advantage that was peculiar to their

teaching.

Their very sharply delineated conception of the

authority and responsibilities of the civil magistrate pre
vented them from straying from the path of the just war
teaching into that of the crusade.

While weapons change, mankind does not.

In addition,

the will to win and the men who form the armies that take up

arms are more important to the military goals of a political
entity than the possession of sophisticated military hard
ware.

The teaching concerning the just war deals with the
conduct of men engaged in combat with one another in a war

as opposed to the specifications of the weapons they wield.
Because this teaching was a correct application of the ar
ticle of faith concerning the duties of the magistrate and
the duties of the Christian citizen when it was formulated

by Luther and those orthodox theologians who followed him,
it is correct today also.

Thus, it is applicable to wars

fought now, for wars are still fought by men, regardless of
the changes in weaponry.

Through years of study, the British strategist and

military historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, concluded that the
beat and most consistently fruitful military strategy is
what he denominated the strategy of the indirect approach.
The object of the strategy of the indirect approach is
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to place the enemy in auch a position that further resis

tance on the part of his forces is^ and can be seen to be^
diaasterous.

This strategy correctly takes into account a

human factor in warfare that has often been overlooked,

namely that the enemy's will to resist must be broken before
there can be a cessation of hostilities.

The easiest way to

break the will of the enemy to continue the fight is to

place him in a situation wherein it is clearly obvious that
surrender is far preferable to the continuation of hostil
ities.

Guerrilla warfare is a means to certain goals of grand

strategy, as are all other forms of warfare.

Guerrilla war

fare seems to fit particularly well the thermo-nuclear sitz
im leben of the last two decades of the twentieth century.

Where the goals of the superpowers conflict one with the
other, it seems reasonable to conclude that we shall see

more guerrilla wars, barring any unforeseeable shift in the

balance of world power or any unforeseeable developments in
military technology or tactics.
The same ethical rules apply in waging war against an

enemy who is conducting guerrilla warfare as apply in any
other armed conflict.

Therefore, if the legitimate gov

erning authority has a justifiable cause in waging its war
against the guerrilla forces, it may employ all allowable
means of force to defeat them.

Moreover, the just war

teaching does not demand a gradual escalation in the amount
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o£ force which la exerted againat the guerrillaa.

Aa a

matter of fact, the 3uat war theory may militate againat

auch gradual eacalation if it would aeem that thia would
merely prolong the atruggle and thereby reault in more harm

being done to both warring partiea and to noncombatanta
caught up in the effecta of the atruggle.
The fact that the guerrilla ia an irregular aoldier

greatly compounda the difficulty of waging war againat him.
Not everyone in Vietnam in the I960'a who wore black pa3amaa, for example, waa a member of the Viet Cong, even if
thia waa often the characteristic dress of the guerrillas.

Remembering the rule calling for war to be waged in

a just manner by avoiding unnecessary injury, suffering, and
hardship among noncombatanta, the tactical leader fighting a
counter-insurgency war must exercise extra care to direct
hia force solely againat the enemy, even when the enemy ia
difficult to find and intentionally blends in with the
civilian population.
It can often be the case that it ia impoaaible to pick

the guerrillas out from among the population.

In such a

situation, the tactical commander in the field must ensure
that his troops do not take out their frustrations at being
unable to find the enemy on the innocent populace.

To per

mit such action will not only violate the rules of the just
war teaching; it will also violate simple common sense.
Mistreating the civilian population will discourage them
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from cooperating with the counter-insurgency forces and, at
the same time, tend to encourage at least covert cooperation
with the guerrilla forces.

When it is impossible to extract the guerrillas from
among the populace, then the strategy of the counterinsurgency war should include programs designed to win the

populace away from the guerrillas.

Such a strategy should

include a very careful study of the goals that the guer
rillas have established in order to bring their movement

some degree of popular support.

Often the guerrilla forces

have been very accurate in pinpointing wrongs that afflict
the community.

If this is the case and there are genuine

problems in the administration of the government in place,
these must be corrected promptly and visibly.

As long as

there is corruption or prejudice prevalent in the govern
ment, the guerrilla movement will have a ready supply of
discontent upon which to feed and to ferment revolt.
However, history teaches that a counter-guerrilla war
is as rarely won by economic and administrative measures

alone as it is won by military measures alone.

go hand in hand.

The two must

Thus, in order to alleviate the suffering

of those not directly involved in combat but who are victims

for guerrilla terrorism and to alleviate that suffering as

rapidly as possible, it behooves the established government
to move against the guerrilla forces with the best military
means at their disposal.
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There seema t.o be a diat-inct. poaalbillby t-hat. bhe moat

effective meana of fighting a counter-guerrilla war may be
among the leaat aophiaticated.

Carpet-bombing with tona of

thousand pound bombs may reduce a vast number of trees to

splinters and create water-filled craters where once rice
paddies flourished, but it will not kill any guerrillas

unless they are in the area where the bombs land.
Experience tends to indicate that a much more effec
tive way of dealing with guerrillas may involve waiting a
week or more until a single guerrilla walks into an ambush.

Such a tactic may be far less spectacular and dramatic that
tona of bombs raining destruction out of the sky, but in the
long run, there are clear indications that it may be faster
and

more effective.

It is quite clear that the real war to be waged in

fighting against a guerrilla force is the war that is waged
for the minds of the guerrillas.

In a counter-guerrilla

war, as in no other, the psychological battle for the mind
of the individual soldier is of tremendous importance.

Each guerrilla is usually a portion of a small team
with a distinct tactical role to play in that team.

If one

guerrilla defects and surrenders, he leaves a hole in his
team that must be filled, but he does far more harm than

merely that.

By his defection, he has cast a vote for the

established government with his feet, and, in so doing, he
has inflicted invisible psychological wounds on all of the
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other

members of that team.

Adhering strictly to just means in the prosecution of
a counter-guerrilla war will enhance the prospects that
guerrillas will surrender.

Torture and mistreatment of

prisoners thus are both outside the conduct considered jus
tifiable by a just war teaching and are also impractical.
Nations generally expect that their military leaders
will be men of honor, meriting the respect and the obedience
of their subordinates.

In the free world, certainly, mili

tary leadership rests upon a foundation of respect for the
one issuing the orders, and the cornerstone of that founda
tion of respect is the adherence of the leader to strict
ethical standards.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cotton of the

Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, has written,
I would like . . . to underscore the fact that we con

sider the ethical dimensions of the military profession
to be central to the training and broader socialization
of officers in the Canadian Forces. This is brought

out, I would suggest, in the motto of the Royal Military
College, "Truth, Duty, Valour," which is very much a
part of the reality of College life. These moral pre
cepts are not the only ones applicable to the military
profession and leadership, but they are decidedly cen
tral to it, and they imply moral qualities of honesty,
integrity, loyalty, obedience, and concern. We believe
these qualities to be of fundamental importance, and

stress them in training and education.^
^Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cotton to Frank Morgret,
15 April 1982.

It is only appropriate that I acknowledge here the
valuable assistance I received from Colonel Cotton of the

Royal Military College, Kingston; Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth
Wenkler, U.S.A.F., Head of the Department of Philosophy and
Fine Arts, U.S. Air Force Academy; and Captain J. B. Kramer,
U.S.N., Dean of Academics, U.S. Naval War College, Newport,
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Colonel Cot.t.on cont.inuea,

Although it is very difficult to eatabllah the exact
relationship empirically between moral qualities and
leader effectiveness, it is generally accepted in the
western military tradition that they are inextricably
linked. All major discussions of the topic have
stressed this. . .

Ultimately, there is a very utilitarian reason why
morality is so fundamental to military leadership.

It is

fundamental to military leadership for precisely the same
reason it is fundamental to pastoral leadership.

For a man

to be followed he must be trusted by those he would lead.
As Colonel Cotton has written,

. . . X see the leader-follower relationship as neces

sarily based on trust and reciprocal confidence.

The

evidence and opinion in the literature suggests very

strongly that the officer must build a relationship

Rhode Island.

Commander Ray D. Hunter, R.N., executive officer of
Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Devon, England,
deserves a special word of appreciation. Between the time
that I wrote asking for information concerning the leader

ship training at the Royal Naval College and Commander
Hunter's receipt of my letter he, along with the rest of the
senior officers of the Royal Navy, were catapaulted into the

planning and execution of Operation Corporate by the Argentian invasion of the Falkland Islands.

That Commander

Hunter found time to provide me with assistance under these
circumstances provides but another example of the unflappability for which the Royal Navy has been justly famous ever
since its victory over the Armada.
The contributions of all of these gentlemen to my

research, as well as their interest in my project and their

encouragement, have been instrumental in its successful
completion.

^Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton to Frank Horgret,
15 April 1982.
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founded on "trust, and integrity i£ the cohesion so neces

sary to military effectiveness is to be created.^
It would be a display of almost incredible naivete

were one to suggest that wars are conducted entirely and
always according to the rules established by the Lutheran
teaching concerning the just war.

In fact, there are those

who would go so far as to question whether any rules may be
made to apply in warfare.

To that question the answer is a

most unequivocal "Yea.**
The existence of the various international protocols

and conventions regulating the rules of war*^ testifies to
the fact that war still has not descended to the level of

totally unregulated violence.

Lest one should say that the

mere existence of rules does not speak to their enforcement,

the remarks of Major M. J. Samuelson, Royal Marines, are
instructive.

Writing concerning the lessons learned by the

Royal Marines in their operations in the Falklands, Major
Samuelson states

On the administrative aide, we had been unprepared for
the scale of the prisoner of war problem and--although
we are confident that we kept on the right side of the
Geneva convention--a general teach-in on the laws of

armed conflict has been well received.^

^Ibid.
4An excellent compilation of the various treaties
governing the rules of conflict is to be found in Adam
Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds.. Documents on the Laws of
War

<Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

^M. J. Samuelson, ''Royal Marines and the ^Corporate' Ex
perience," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 19d4>:153.
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The moralit.y displayed by a country in waging war re

flects the morality of that country in its other pursuits.
Ultimately^ the morality of her military officers cannot
rise all that much higher than the morality of the rest of
her citizens.

Simply to lash out at the immorality of some

incidents involving military offiers is to deal with a symp
tom but to leave the basic disease untouched.

The waging of

a 3ust war requires 3ust means of conflict, and these 3ust
means will be those exercised by moral leadership.

Unless a

society is capable of producing men of high moral character
to lead her armies, she cannot wage war 3ustly.
The traditional Lutheran teaching that a war is 3uat

if it is undertaken by the appropriate authority with a

legitimate cause and subsequently waged using 3uatifiable
means can be validly applied to counter-guerrilla warfare
in the twentieth century.

It provides a sound guide for

determining the morality of the conduct of such a war.
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